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Article 
State Capitalism on the Ascent: Stress, Shock, and 
Adaptation of the International Law on Foreign 
Investment 
By Julien Chaisse  
Abstract 
This Article focuses on the rise of state capitalism and its 
consequences on the international law of foreign investment and 
transnational arbitration which were both historically designed 
to regulate foreign private investments. The increasingly free 
movement of capital and the dominance of multinational 
corporations in cross-border trade and investment have brought 
with them increased suspicion about the motives of state-
controlled entities (SCEs) when they invest, allocate scarce 
resources, procure goods and services, and move goods and 
services across national borders. When state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) become involved in 
transnational economic activities, either as the perceived 
“transgressor” or as the “defender” in the face of rules or 
administrative actions targeted towards such entities, the 
debate becomes increasingly tense. The increased suspicion 
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includes concerns by countries about threats to their national 
security and to the competitive interests of producers and 
consumers based in their respective territories, among other 
concerns. This Article revisits the concept of state capitalism as 
it has developed in three key jurisdictions (China, France and 
the United States). It then presents the key legal international 
instruments granting rights to SCEs and obligations upon host 
States by looking at the litigation forum SCEs can access. By 
looking at the litigation options available to SCEs, this Article 
clarifies and evaluates the progressive adaptation of economic 
rules to State capitalism and demonstrate the gradual inclusion 
of SCEs in the world economy and its rules. 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite the increasing trend towards market liberalization 
and privatization observed over the last two decades,1 the role of 
the state (not to say state interventionism2) has in this period of 
time arguably grown in importance in the sphere of national and 
transnational business activities.3 Notably, investments from 
emerging economies have increased, a large proportion of which 
was executed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs)4 and sovereign 
 
 1. See Larry Cata Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global 
Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-owned Enterprises, and the 
Chinese Experience, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 180 (2010); Ian 
Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market, 88 
FOREIGN AFF. 40 (2009) (discussing how the recent economic crisis is 
underlining the role to be played by the national governments in no certain 
terms); see also Niall Ferguson, We’re All State Capitalists Now, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Feb. 9, 2012, 10:51 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/09/were-all-state-
capitalists-now/. 
 2. See Joshua Kurlantzick, State Capitalism and the Return of Economic 
Interventionism, WORLD POL. REV. (July 12, 2016), http://www.worldpolitics
review.com/articles/19334/state-capitalism-and-the-return-of-economic-
interventionism. 
 3. See also Joseph L. Bower et al., Global Capitalism at Risk: What Are 
You Doing About It?, HARV. BUS. REV. 105 (2011); see also Christopher A. 
McNally, Sino-Capitalism: China’s Reemergence and the International Political 
Economy, 64 WORLD POL. 765 (2012); see generally Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G. 
Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varities of State Capitalism and their 
Implications for Economic Performance, HARV. BUS. SCH. 1 (2012) (discussing 
the extent and reach of state capitalism around the world, and its economic 
implications); New Masters of the Universe: State Capitalism’s Global Reach, 
ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21542925. 
 4. See The Visible Hand, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), 
https://www.economist.com/node/21542931; see also U.S.–CHINA ECON. 
SECURITY REV. COMM’N, 112th CONG., ANN. REP. at 40 (2011). International 
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wealth funds (SWFs).5 This trend has been further reinforced 
since 2008/2009 by the fact that sovereign investors have 
blatantly retained their influence, despite the fears and 
turbulences that spread all over the world in the wake of the 
global economic and financial crisis.6 
The rise of sovereign investment via state-controlled 
entities (SCEs) is more than the addition of a new asset class.7 
 
tribunals have had to define SOEs, and the Salini v. Morocco decision on 
jurisdiction notes that generally any commercial company dominated or 
predominantly controlled by the State or by State institutions, whether it has a 
legal personality or not, is considered to be a State-owned company. See Salini 
Costruttori v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3, 
(July 16, 2001). Furthermore, the Al-Kharafi & Sons v. Libya Final Arbitral 
Award notes that, in certain circumstances, the separate personality of an 
entity fully controlled by a State can be discarded and the State is considered 
to be bound by the terms of a contract entered into by such an entity. 
Accordingly, the tribunal decides that the arbitration clause set out in the 
contract may be invoked against various State organs/entities. See Al-Kharafi 
& Sons Co. v. Libya, Final Arbitral Award, 263, 266, 268, (Mar. 22, 2013). The 
definition of SOEs is controversial. Official statistics from the Chinese Ministry 
of Finance define SOEs as including only wholly state-owned companies. In this 
article, SOEs are defined more broadly to include wholly state-owned SOEs and 
companies whose majority shares are owned by the Chinese government at 
various levels (including the central, provincial, and municipal levels), see Scott 
Cendrowski, China’s Global 500 Companies are Bigger than Ever – and Mostly 
State-Owned, FORTUNE (July 22, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/china-
global-500-government-owned/. 
 5. Both forms of investments originate from state ownership and state 
activity, and are thus regularly referred to as investments by “state-controlled 
entities” (SCEs). See R. Gilson & C.J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and 
Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1346 (2008); see also Julien Chaisse et al., Emerging Sovereign 
Wealth Funds in the Making: Assessing the Economic Feasibility and Regulatory 
Strategies, 45 J. WORLD TRADE 837 (2011); Musacchio & Lazzarini, supra note 
3. 
 6. See David Welch et al., Smithfield Stoking U.S. Unease Belies Benefit 
of China Deals, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-06-06/smithfield-stoking-u-s-unease-belies-benefit-of-chinese-
deals.html (“Private companies are also freer of government influence.”). See 
generally Thilo Hanemann & Adam Lysenko, Chinese FDI in the United States: 
Q1 2013 Update, RHODIUM GROUP (Apr. 30, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/chinese-
fdi-in-the-united-states-q1-2013-update (“In the past 15 months private 
Chinese firms spent more on US deals than in the 11 years before combined. In 
the same period, they accounted for 80% of transactions and 50% of total 
transaction value, a dramatic change compared to previous years when state-
owned firms dominated Chinese capital flows to the US.”). 
 7. See Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State Under International Law 
for the Breach of Contract Committed by a State-Owned Entity, 28 BERKLEY J. 
INT’L L. 1, 142 (2010) (“In many countries, entities that are owned by the state 
but possess a separate legal personality (“state-owned entities”‘) play a key role 
in strategically important sectors.”). 
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The SCEs’ growth prowess is a reflection of the new role of 
developing economies, and this illustrates a shift in emphasis in 
the global economy.8 Just as the norm in recent decades was for 
Western companies and portfolio investors to invest in emerging 
and developing countries—meaning capital flowed from North to 
South—it is now observed that the present capital surpluses in 
the South will seek out investment opportunities in the North.9 
In some cases this is achieved through private sector 
investment, but because many emerging and developing 
countries do not (for various reasons) have privately owned 
companies of sufficient size to invest significantly in 
industrialized countries, this is increasingly done by SCEs, 
which makes state capitalism a key feature of contemporary 
global economy. 
Such an evolution is generating a number of political and 
economic problems that the law has to address. SCEs’ 
transnational economics raises concerns because it highlights 
the importance of state activity in the global economy which is 
perceived as detrimental to the role of market forces.10 The legal 
analysis has already explored the ramifications in the trade 
world.11 The issue is far more serious when one looks at the 
international capital trends and prospects. SCEs make 
significant investments across borders which allow them to 
control local assets. The reality of foreign investment, and the 
 
 8. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], State-Owned 
Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications, TAD/TC/WP
(2012)10/FINAL (May 18, 2012). See generally Elizabeth J. Drake, Chinese 
State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, Testimony before the US-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission 1 (2012) (discussing how the economies with 
high SOE shares account for much smaller shares of world trade than China 
and display a strong heterogeneity with regard to their role in world trade, 
relative to their GDP). 
 9. See also Julien Chaisse, Issues for State-controlled Entities, in 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
MITSUO MATSUSHITA 235 (Julien Chaisse & Tsai-Yu Lin eds., 2016). 
 10. See Recruitment, STATE-OWNED ASSETS SUPERVISION AND ADMIN. 
COMM’N OF THE STATE COUNCIL (June 28, 2004), http://en.sasac.gov.cn/
n1461859/c1463576/content.html; U.S.–CHINA ECON. AND SECURITY REV. 
COMM’N, supra note 4; Cendrowski, supra note 4; see generally Wooldridge, 
supra note 4 (discussing the rise of state capitalism, as an alternative to liberal 
capitalism). 
 11. For an in-depth analysis, see Ming Du, China’s State Capitalism and 
World Trade Law, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 409 (2014) (analyzing how China’s 
practice of state capitalism challenges the world trading system and how WTO 
law, as interpreted by WTO Panels and the WTO Appellate Body (AB), 
addresses these challenges). 
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idea that foreigners may control national assets, has given rise 
to a number of “protectionist reactions.” There are fears that 
SCEs may not make investment decisions based on economic 
reasons, but instead they may choose to invest for political 
purposes.12 Further, most countries that have set up SCEs are 
located in the developing world, which ultimately may result in 
a politicization of capital flows vis-à-vis SCEs.13 The legal 
problems raised by SCEs’ investments will become more acute 
because, as a result of the financial crisis and the ensuing 
recession, the need for international investment in the United 
States or the European Union (EU) will also continue to grow, 
and this will inevitably increase the probability that SCEs will 
face obstacles in foreign markets and hence will resort to 
international dispute settlement to resolve this new kind of 
dispute. 
However, the legal situation is complex. Although Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) has increased significantly over the last 
two decades—outpacing the already significant expansion of 
trade during the same period—the current international legal 
framework for SCE investments is highly fragmented.14 The 
current framework consists of a wide variety of national and 
international rules and principles that differ in form, strength, 
and coverage.15 The result is an increasingly complex 
 
 12. See Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent 
Dictators: Lessons for Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227 (2011) 
(discussing policy changes that favor politically influential interest groups). 
 13. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). For discussions of the 
empire-building incentives of China’s SOE managers, see Angela H. Zhang, 
Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. 
& BUS. 395 (2014). 
 14. See generally Julien Chaisse & Chistian Bellak, Navigating the 
Expanding Universe of Investment Treaties—Creation and Use of Critical Index, 
18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79 (2015) (explaining the lack of a general theory to analyze 
the expanding patchwork of international foreign investment). 
 15. These separate investment chapters in PTAs are comparable, on 
average, to self-standing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). They can include 
both rules on investment liberalization (non-discrimination safeguards) and 
investment protection (substantive standards of treatment afforded by the host 
state to the foreign investor or investment). See United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Dev.(UNCTAD), Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, UNCTAD 
22 (2014). The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a prime 
example of an agreement with a wide scope covering investment since it 
includes three members. See North American Free Trade Agreement-NAFTA, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nafta.asp (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2018). The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is another example of 
ambitious trade pat including investment matters with twelve members. See 
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international setting for international investment in which 
foreign investors can reap the benefits of rights that ensure their 
investments great protection. Along with an increase in number 
of International Investment Agreements (IIAs), the last decade 
has also witnessed an exponential surge in investment disputes 
between foreign investors and host country governments,16 and 
one can anticipate seeing a growing number of cases brought by 
SCEs before international investment arbitral tribunals. It is 
precisely this legal scenario that this Article wants to explore. 
The international regime for foreign investment, which 
includes both substantive rules and arbitration principles, is 
gradually adjusting to the emergence of SCEs in the investment 
sphere. This adjustment implicitly means that the rules and 
practice of international investment are reshaped by actors that 
were not initially at the center of the regime. Actually it is a 
great paradox; the regime for foreign investment, as designed in 
the last three decades, was intended to serve the interest of 
private investors seen as the main driver of the global economy. 
Instead of excluding SCEs from its realm and favoring the 
emergence of different rules, the international investment 
regime is gradually absorbing state capitalism. This Article 
provides a detailed analysis of the forces driving this 
transformation, of the flexibility of the international norms that 
apply to SCEs, and, finally, of the rights that SCEs are 
acquiring. 
To demonstrate that state capitalism is reshaping 
international economic law, this Article first discusses the rise 
of capitalism at the global level from both economic and legal 
perspectives (although a strong focus is on China, the analysis 
also covers the cases of both the United States and France). In 
the second section, the relevant norms of international economic 
 
Elizabeth Sheargold, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 BR. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES 
341 (2016) (providing an overview of the recently concluded TPP Agreement). 
 16. On the emerging issue of sovereign debt restructuring by international 
tribunals, see Julien Chaisse et al., Greek Debt Restructuring, Abaclat v. 
Argentina and Investment Treaty Commitments: The Impact of International 
Investment Agreements on the Greek Default, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
LAW AFTER THE GLOBAL CRISIS: A TALE OF FRAGMENTED DISCIPLINES 306 (C.L. 
Lim & Bryan Mercurio, eds. 2015). Arbitral panels are charged with the task of 
applying the rules of IIAs in specific cases, an often-complex process given the 
broad and sometimes ambiguous terms of these arrangements. See generally 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 
12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 173 (2005) (noting that foreign investors are 
increasingly resorting to the mechanism of international arbitration for 
resolving their disputes with the government of a host country). 
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law are reviewed with a view to understand which would best fit 
the need of SCEs in their transnational activities. The third 
section addresses the critical issue of the legal standing of SCEs 
under investment treaties, since it determines the ability of 
SCEs to effectively benefit from international rights. Finally, the 
fourth section analyzes the substantive rights which can benefit 
SCEs and which will drive the investment strategies of many 
SCEs in the coming years. 
I. THE RISE OF STATE CAPITALISM 
The term “state capitalism” means an economic system in 
which the state controls a substantial part of or even all of 
capital, industry and business.17 It is therefore a command 
system where all or part of the means of production are legally 
the property of the state, or subject to its guidelines. Sometimes 
the means of production are in fact held, private or controlled, 
by the privileged class of the population that monopolizes 
political power. This expression appeared in the late nineteenth 
century, in the midst of the anti-capitalist movement, and was 
presented as a negative perspective.18 Its use has expanded 
during the twentieth century.19 There are differences, especially 
in terms of political affinity, as the plans are or have been state 
capitalist. Among the schemes often analyzed as such are: 
Germany in the First World War, the Soviet Union, and now 
China, Cuba and Algeria, from Houari Boumedienne.20 This 
section discusses the notion of “state capitalism” before it looks 
at key examples of contemporary “state capitalism” entities in 
the United States, France, and China. 
 
 
 
 17. There is a growing literature on state capitalism and its implications 
for legal changes in China. See, e.g., Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We are 
the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism 
in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 699 (2013); Du, supra note 11. For a discourse 
on state capitalism in general, see, e.g., Bremmer, supra note 1, at 40. 
 18. See, e.g., Mariana Pargendler et al., In Strange Company: The Puzzle of 
Private Investment in State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569 (2013). 
 19. Id. at 571. 
 20. See generally Julien Chaisse, supra note 9, at 238–39 (discussing state 
capitalism and potential market distortions among world schemes). 
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A. THE NOTION OF STATE CAPITALISM 
There is no single definition of “state capitalism.”21 State 
capitalism is similar to state socialism (i.e. mostly adopted in 
those socialist states, such as China and Cuba). 
[It is] usually described as an economic system in which 
commercial economic activity is undertaken by the state 
in the form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) resulting 
in the state owning and controlling most of the means of 
production and capital. Also, the management and 
organization of that SOEs’ means of production is in a 
capitalist manner. Ming Du stated that state capitalism 
is the Chinese economic system, which is fundamentally 
different from western liberal market capitalism. Also, 
the substantial reason that state capitalism has been 
developed in China is because the Chinese government 
has transformed from a command economy to a market 
economy (i.e. socialism with Chinese characteristics). 
The way that the Chinese government exercised the 
‘state capitalism’ is that they directly or indirectly 
controlled a large number of powerful SOEs, especially 
in strategic and key sectors (e.g. China Sinopec).22 
Kratsas and Truby stated that the ‘interests of sovereign 
and private investors clash’ through state directed 
capitalism market and accept Keynes’s maxim that 
‘international cash flows are always political,’ and 
Kratsas and Truby have stated that is problematic.23 
In essence, the term “state capitalism” can refer to economic 
systems in which capitalism is entirely state driven, or, by 
extension of another system, where private capitalism has 
strong state dependence.24 In the latter case, the term can be 
 
 21. See generally Catherine P. Mulder, State Capitalism vis-à-vis Private 
Communism, 27 RETHINKING MARXISM 258 (2015) (discussing state-owned 
enterprises, and the oversimplified approach of labeling them exclusively as 
either part of the public or private sector); see also Musacchio & Lazzarini, 
supra note 4. 
 22. Id. at 409. 
 23. See Julien Chaisse, Demystifying Public Security Exception and 
Limitations on Capital Movement: Hard Law, Soft Law and Sovereign 
Investments in the EU Internal Market, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 583, 589 (2016) 
(citing to Du, supra note 11, at 409, 411; Mulder, supra note 21, at 259). 
 24. See also Chao Xi, The Political Economy of Takeover Regulation: What 
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confused with concepts and precise theories such as 
mercantilism, protectionism, or interventionism. The latter 
usage, more common in English and French, is then used to 
support the opposition to “laissez-faire” and refers to economic 
policies such as the New Deal.25 
Historically, Mikhail Bakunin has developed the theoretical 
beginnings of Statism and Anarchy in concept, and in his 
writings, he criticizes Karl Marx’s theories, describing them as 
“authoritarian communism.”26 Bakunin proclaimed that the 
application of Marxist theories simply leads to the application of 
capital to production by the only banker, the state, which means 
that the state would behave in the same way that a capitalist 
manager (such a banker or a boss) would.27 Fifty years later, 
some anarchists see a confirmation of the predictions of Bakunin 
in the economic reality of the Soviet Union—even if the economic 
policy in the USSR did not correspond to the economic thinking 
of Karl Marx.28 
In light of these theories, a public company, or a state 
enterprise, can be defined as a company over which the state or 
other authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant 
influence by virtue of ownership, financial participation or the 
rules which govern, as defined in the EU.29 Such dominant 
influence is presumed when the public authorities, directly or 
indirectly, in respect to the company, hold the majority of the 
subscribed capital of the company or control the majority of the 
votes attached to shares issued by the company or may appoint 
more than half the members of the administrative, 
management, or business surveillance.30 
 
 
Does the Mandatory Bid Rule in China Tell Us, 2 J. BUS. L. 142 (2015). 
 25. For an excellent overview, see Federico Fabbrini, Europe in Need of a 
New Deal, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1175 (2011). 
 26. See generally Michael Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy, in CAMBRIDGE 
TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 106 (Raymond Geuss ed., 1990) 
(discussing statism and anarchy in the context of the struggle between parties 
in the International Working Men’s Association). 
 27. Id. at 172. 
 28. See Noah Chomsky, Notes on Anarchism, in FOR REASONS OF STATE 
(1973), https://chomsky.info/state01/. 
 29. See Fabbrini, supra note 25, at 1175. 
 30. See Du, supra note 11, at 435. 
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B. THE CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF STATE CAPITALISM 
Talking about SOEs immediately brings China into the 
spotlight, but there are many other jurisdictions where SOEs are 
important economic actors. A number of state enterprises do 
exist within the EU—and France is a fascinating case in point.31 
Outside the EU, public enterprises may also correspond to this 
definition, including some in the United States, where they exist 
in two legal forms. The first are federal public companies (of 
which there are very few and are usually temporarily acquired 
by the federal government and placed under judicial supervision, 
according to Chapter 11 of the United States bankruptcy law in 
sectors considered strategic and in order to avoid their 
liquidation under Chapter 7). The second are public companies 
of the state (many of which are owned or controlled by one of the 
federal states, or even several states associated in the operation 
if companies are larger in size).32 
1. China’s State Capitalism 
In the latest Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States (CFIUS) report to Congress there were ninety-
seven covered transactions, and twenty-one of those by Chinese 
investors in 2013.33 Behind this suspicion lies the perception 
that China’s businesses are too close to the Communist Party.34 
It also shows how important Chinese investments have become 
to the United States, while a number of Chinese companies 
remain controlled by the state.35 
 
 31. See also Benjamin Mojuyé, French Corporate Governance in the New 
Millennium: Who Watches the Board in Corporate France, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
73 (2000); see also Justin Yifu Lin et al., Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-
Owned Enterprise Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1998). 
 32. See generally Frieder Roessler, State Trading and Trade Liberalization, 
in STATE TRADING IN INTERNATIONAL MARKETS 264 (M.M. Kostechi ed., 1982) 
(examining different approaches to the liberalization of trade). 
 33. See COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., 114TH CONG., ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (Comm. Print 2015); see also WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL33534, CHINA’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 1 (2012). 
 34. See Mitchell Silk & Richard Malish, Are Chinese Companies Taking 
over the World, 7 CHINA J. INT’L L. 105 (2006); Jason Dean et al., China’s ‘State 
Capitalism’ Sparks a Global Backlash, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703514904575602731006315198. 
 35. See generally EXIT THE DRAGON?: PRIVATIZATION AND STATE CONTROL 
IN CHINA 16 (Stephen Green & Guy S. Liu eds., Chatham House 2006) 
(evaluating China’s privatization experience); see also U.S.-CHINA ECON. 
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In this new economic system, public enterprises, or 
“Danwei,” are struggling to find their place and they are 
encountering more and more difficulties.36 They reached record 
losses of 102.6 billion yuan (12.5 billion United States dollars 
(USD)) in 2005, an increase of 56.7% year by year, according to 
figures from the State Bureau of Statistics (NBS).37 In the first 
two months of 2006, losses of public enterprises or state-
controlled enterprises already reached 26.2 billion yuan (3.25 
billion USD).38 The increase in production costs, an inefficient 
pricing system, overcapacity, and significant technological gaps 
are the main causes of this situation, according to Jiang Yuan, a 
statistician at the State Bureau of Statistics.39 
The presence of foreign firms in China is largely responsible 
for the sharp acceleration in export growth.40 The establishment 
of “market socialism” has resulted in the construction of many 
factories in China, which may now be termed the workshops of 
the world, because of the social dumping of its plants.41 They 
attract a skilled workforce in coastal areas as that is where such 
workshops are located. Only 10.3% of China’s exports come from 
wholly Chinese companies.42 Today, 43.2% of exports from China 
are made by companies whose capital is 100% foreign and 46.5% 
are the result of partnerships between foreign companies and 
Chinese companies.43 Mainland China maintains its 
 
SECURITY REV. COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES AND 
STATE CAPITALISM IN CHINA 76 (Comm. Print 2011); Yuanzheng Cao et. al., 
From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style, 7 ECON. IN 
TRANSITION 103 (1999); Shaomin Li et. al., The Road to Capitalism: 
Competition and Institutional Change in China, 28 J. COMP. ECON. 269 (2000); 
Minxie Pei, The Dark Side of China’s Rise, FOREIGN POL. (Oct. 20 2009), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/the-dark-side-of-chinas-rise/. 
 36. See Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The 
Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 231–32 (2008). 
 37. SOEs’ losses hit record US$12.75b in 2005, China Daily (Mar. 28, 2006, 
8:55 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/28/content_553865.
htm. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. See also See Chinese State-Owned and State Controlled Enterprises: 
Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises: Hearing Before 
the U.S-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm’n, 112th Cong. 127 (2012) 
(statement of Elizabeth J. Drake, Partner, Stewart and Stewart); OECD, 
International Trade and Investment by State Enterprises, (Sept. 2012). 
 40. See, e.g., Silk & Malish, supra note 34, at107. 
 41. See McNally, supra note 3, at756–58. 
 42. Nature of China’s Export Enterprises, Foreign Investment Monthly, 
Ministry of Commerce China, Table 5, http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/table2016//
tab05.pdf 
 43. Id. 
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attractiveness for companies with its labor force, which is cheap, 
non-unionized, and docile. An unskilled worker in China costs 
about one USD per hour, which is well below the minimum wage 
of the industrialized countries.44 The non-organization of 
Chinese workers represents a substantial benefit for employers, 
who find such “job flexibility” impossible to implement in liberal 
democracies. Together, the two Chinese giants of mobile 
telephone companies, namely, China Mobile and China Unicom, 
have about a billion customers.45 
A series of reforms accompanied the dual internal 
liberalization and opening movement on the world market.46 
One law authorized individuals to have limited liability 
companies.47 In 2004, the Constitution was revised to strengthen 
 
 44. Education Bureau of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Resource Pack for Economics Curriculum (Secondary 4-6): Economic Analysis 
and Evolution of Government Policies: Minimum Wage 2015, 2-3. (“Since the 
last update in 2009, the federal minimum wage has stood at US$7.25 per hour 
[in the United States].” “In China, the Provisions on Minimum Wages were 
effective from March 1, 2004. The setting of minimum wage is delegated to local 
governments, which choose a monthly minimum for full-time workers, and an 
hourly minimum for part-time workers.” “There is a wide range of minimum 
wage levels across the country. In general, the highest wages are in the more 
developed coastal regions and the lowest ones in the less developed central and 
western provinces. . . . The lowest ones were around RMB10 (US$1.64).”) 
 45. See Number of Mobile Subscribers in China as of January 2016, by 
Operator (In Millions), STATISTIA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/291795/
china-mobile-subscribers/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). 
 46. See generally John Hassard et al., China’s State-Owned Enterprises: 
Economic Reform and Organizational Restructuring, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE MGMT. 500 (2010) (discussing reforms of state-owned enterprises since 
the beginning of China’s “open door” policy); Jonathan R. Woetzel, Reassessing 
China’s State-Owned Enterprises, MCKINSEY Q. 1 (2008) (considering the value 
state-owned companies might bring to a global partnership); see also Xu 
Chenggang, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and 
Development, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1076 (2011); Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 
17. 
 47. During the SOE reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s, the government 
allowed SOEs to retain an individually negotiated percentage of their profits, 
which could be used to finance benefits and awards paid to managers and 
employees. A 1994 tax reform set a uniform rate of tax on SOE profits; any 
remaining profits belonged to the SOEs. See Louis Kuijs et al., SOE Dividends: 
How Much and To Whom? 2 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 56651, 2005), 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org.easyaccess1.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/09/17/00033495520100917050418/
Rendered/PDF/566510WP0SOE1E10Box353729B01PUBLIC1.pdf. However, 
between 1994 and 2007, the state collected no dividends from SOEs. See 
Nicholas Borst, SOE Dividends and Economic Rebalancing, PETERSON INST. 
INT’L ECON. (May 11, 2012, 12:30 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/china-economic-
watch/soe-dividends-and-economic-rebalancing. 
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the role of the non-state sector and to reaffirm the right of 
private property.48 The prohibition on private companies to 
intervene in certain sectors (infrastructure, public services, 
financial services) was abolished in 2004.49 FDI was allowed and 
encouraged by the development of coastal zones and the 
lowering of tariffs. The state monopoly on foreign trade was 
dismantled and the multiple exchange rate system was 
introduced.50 The private sector was expanded: “[b]etween 2010 
and 2012, private sector firms produced between two-thirds and 
three-quarters of China’s GDP; it also accounts for 90% of 
China’s exports.”51 But, exports of the private sector under 
Chinese control are still growing faster, as it receives new export 
licenses.52 The state sector is parallel subject to ongoing 
 
 48. See Alberto Gabriele, The Role of the State in China’s Industrial 
Development: A Reassessment, 52 COMP. ECON. STUD. 348 (2010). 
 49. Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property 
Law and the Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317, 
335 (2008). 
 50. See Xu Chenggang, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms 
and Development, 49 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1076 (2011). 
 51. See Hassard et al., supra note 46. Jonathan Eckart, 8 Things You Need 
to Know about China’s Economy, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (June 23, 2016) 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/8-facts-about-chinas-economy/. 
 52. According to the ChinaDaily: 
China’s private sector is gradually regaining momentum after a 
gloomy 2016, as businesses become more optimistic on the country’s 
economic outlook. In the first half of the year, fixed-asset investments 
by the private sector grew 7.2 percent year on year, accounting for 60.7 
percent of total investment, according to data from the National 
Bureau of Statistics. The growth was much higher than the 3.2 percent 
registered last year . . . .China’s economy expanded 6.9 percent for the 
first half of 2017 . . . .China’s foreign trade increased at its fastest pace 
since the second half of 2011, with exports in yuan-denominated terms 
up 15 percent year on year in the first half of this year (2017). 
Xinhua, China’s Private Sector Regains Strength on Optimistic Economic 
Outlook, ChinaDaily.com (August, 2, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
business/2017-08/02/content_30328022.htm. 
China has recently changed their regulatory rules to reflect this growth: 
All institutions issuing export licenses for goods, and relevant 
enterprises and entities: In accordance with the Foreign Trade Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, the Regulation of the People’s Republic 
of China on the Administration of the Import and Export of Goods and 
the Measures for the Administration of Export Licenses for Goods, the 
matters concerning the application for, issuance and use, and other 
matters of export licenses for goods are clarified as follows: 
1. The enterprises and entities applying for alumina, magnesia, 
talcum lump (powder), fluorite, rare earth, tin and tin products, 
tungsten and tungsten products, molybdenum, antimony and 
antimony products, coke, silicon carbide, and indium and indium 
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restructuring, which has led to the removal of millions of jobs 
between 1998 and 2010.53 “Some 42 per cent of all SOEs lost 
money in 2013, according to official data. Total profits for such 
groups fell in absolute terms last year for the first time since 
2001. The gap in return on assets between SOEs and private 
firms is now the largest in two decades.”54 The tax system is 
highly decentralized in China, and the provinces and small 
governments that manage a large share of the tax revenue are 
 
products (see the Annual Catalogue of Goods Subject to Export 
Licensing Administration for H.S. codes) shall apply for export 
licenses for goods based on the export contracts for goods. 
2. The relevant license-issuing institutions shall, in accordance with 
laws and regulations, effectively conduct the issuance of export 
licenses for goods, further standardize their processes, optimize their 
services, and ensure that export licenses for goods are issued and other 
relevant matters are handled within the prescribed time limit. 
3. The relevant enterprises and entities shall use export licenses for 
goods in accordance with the law, and shall not trade, transfer, alter 
or forge such licenses. 
商务部配额许可证事务局关于货物出口许可证申领、签发等事宜的函 [Letter on 
Matters Concerning the Application for, Issuance of, and Other Matters 
Concerning, the Export Licenses for Goods] (promulgated by the Admin. Bureau 
of Ministry of Com., effective date Jan. 25, 2017) LawInfoChina. 
The Ministry of Commerce added new items to the application for an export 
license as well: 
The export of goods subject to export License Administration by 
foreign-invested enterprises shall be handled in accordance with the 
following requirements: (1) For the export of goods subject to export 
quota administration by a foreign-invested enterprise, the issuing 
agency shall issue export license in accordance with the export quota 
quantity of such foreign-invested enterprise issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce; for the export of goods subject to quota tendering 
administration, relevant approval documents specified in Article 11(2) 
shall be attached. 
货物出口许可证管理办法 [Order No.11, Measures for the Administration of 
License for the Export of Goods] (promulgated by the Ministry of Com., effective 
Jul. 1, 2008), at art. 13. 
 53. Dong Zhang & Owen Freestone, China’s Unfinished State-owned 
Enterprise Reforms, ECON. ROUNDUP, AUSTRL. GOV’T, TREASURY (2103) 
https://treasury.gov.au/publication/economic-roundup-issue-2-2013-2/
economic-roundup-issue-2-2013/chinas-unfinished-state-owned-enterprise-
reforms/#P8_131 (“ . . . SOEs accounted for 20 per cent of total industrial 
employment in 2010, falling from around 60 per cent in 1998. After shedding 
tens of millions of workers while undergoing various reforms, SOEs are no 
longer China’s major employer. The share of workers employed by SOEs have 
more than halved between 1998 and 2010. The non-state sector is, and will 
continue to be, the main source of employment.”). 
 54. Gabriel Wildau, China’s State-owned Zombie Economy, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/253d7eb0-ca6c-11e5-84df-
70594b99fc47. 
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also involved in education and health.55 There is very little 
financial solidarity between the provinces.56 
In his last speech on the State of the Union, President 
Barack Obama said that “anyone who tells you otherwise, 
anyone who tells you that America is in decline or that our 
influence has waned, doesn’t know what they are talking 
about.”57 In Beijing, this facile patriotism must make people 
smile. China’s revival threatens American power, especially in 
the Asia-Pacific region. This situation has been clear for some 
time, at least for observers who know what they are talking 
about.58 
The rivalry between the two superpowers is also a rivalry 
between two economic models: market capitalism against state 
capitalism. In fact, market capitalism has just gone through five 
particularly difficult years. Remember the Washington 
Consensus, the list of ten possible measures to Americanize the 
emerging markets in the 1990s?59 The United States 
government and international financial institutions have tried 
to persuade various countries to impose fiscal discipline, to 
reduce or to eliminate their budget deficits, to expand their tax 
base, to lower their tax rates, to allow the market to set its 
interest rates and exchange rates, and to liberalize trade and 
capital flows. When the Asian economies were hit by the 
financial crisis in 1997–1998, critics were quick to lament the 
“crony capitalism” of this region,60 and, at the time, they could 
 
 55. China’s former Premier repeatedly called for political reforms—an 
indication that the Chinese leadership recognizes that further economic reforms 
require new political institutions. See Malcolm Moore, Wen Jiabao Promises 
Political Reform for China, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8040534/Wen-Jiabao-promises-political-
reform-for-China.html; Michael Wines, Wen Calls for Political Reform but 
Sidesteps Details, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
03/15/world/asia/china-wen-jiabao-calls-for-political-reform.html. 
 56. See Gary Hufbauer, China as an Economic Actor on the World Stage: 
An Overview, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE 
PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT 47, 50 (Fredrick M. Abbott ed., 1998); see also 
John H. Jackson, The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO, in CHINA AND 
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 19, 26 (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003). 
 57. Ferguson, supra note 1. 
 58. See, e.g., Mattlin Mikael, Chinese Strategic State-Owned Enterprises 
and Ownership Control, 21 BICCS ASIA PAPER 3, 8 (2010); Bremmer, supra note 
1. 
 59. John Williamson, The Strange History of the Washington Consensus, 27 
J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 195 (2004). 
 60. Alan Beattie, Suharto and the Crisis of Asian Crony Capitalism, 
January 1998, FIN. TIMES (July 18, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/f503fa82-
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claim to have economic history on their side. 
But, since then, America has experienced a financial crisis, 
the biggest since the Great Depression. And the world has 
changed. Not only did the collapse of the financial markets 
(2008–2009) seem to have highlighted the fragility of the 
capitalist system, but the apparent ease with which China has 
escaped the aftermath of the collapse of Wall Street opens up the 
possibility of a new “Beijing Consensus,” based on both central 
planning and a state which can control the fluctuations of 
market forces. In his book, The End of the Free Market, Ian 
Bremmer (the president of Eurasia Group) argues that 
authoritarian governments around the world have “invented 
something new: state capitalism.”61 For Bremmer, state 
capitalism is a major “threat” not only for the model of free trade, 
but also for democracy in the developing world.62 
2. U.S. State Capitalism 
Companies backed by the government (government-
sponsored enterprises, or GSEs)63 are a group of financial service 
companies created by the United States Congress. Their 
function is to improve the flow of credit to targeted sectors of the 
economy and to make these segments a more efficient and 
transparent capital market.64 The desired effect of GSEs is to 
improve the availability and to reduce the cost of credit for 
borrowers’ targeted sectors: agriculture, real estate finance, and 
education.65 Congress created the first GSE in 1916 with the 
creation of the Farm Credit System for financing the 
agricultural sector;66 it initiated GSEs in the real estate 
 
5159-11dd-b751-000077b07658. 
 61. See Bremmer, supra note 1. 
 62. Id. at 55. 
 63. Credit-Rating Agencies and Financial Markets: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Entities of the H. Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of Mark Adelson, Member, 
Adelson-Jacob Consulting). 
 64. In the United States, “[d]istinctions between the governmental and 
private sectors are especially blurred with respect to a category of organization 
known as ‘government-sponsored enterprises’ (GSE).” KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. 
RES. SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT: HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH 
BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL CHARACTERISTICS 7 (2011). 
Typically, GSEs are privately owned but enjoy implicit government guarantees 
of obligations. Id. at 8. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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financing segment with the creation of the Federal Home Loan 
Banks in 1932;67 and targeted education by regulating Sallie 
Mae in 1972.68 The housing loans segment is by far the largest 
borrower’s segment in which GSEs operate. 
Together, the three housing finance GSEs (Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks) hold 
billions of dollars in outstanding loans, as shown in their income 
statements.69 The federal government owns warrants which, if 
exercised, would allow it to take a share of 79.9% ownership in 
these companies.70 The federal government has so far not 
exercised these warrants. These companies include: Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, Farmer Mac, Sallie Mae, and Federal Home 
Loan Banks.71 
Regulated companies held by the federal government 
(federal government-chartered and -owned corporations) are a 
separate set of companies that have been initiated, controlled 
and owned by the federal government to operate in the provision 
of federal public services, but, unlike federal agencies (such as 
the Environmental Protection Agency or the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs) or federal independent commissions (e.g., the Federal 
Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, etc.), they have a separate legal personality from 
the federal government, thereby providing the highest degree of 
independence from political power.72 They sometimes receive 
 
 67. See Julie A. Hill, Bailouts and Credit Cycles: Fannie, Freddie, and the 
Farm Credit System, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2010). 
 68. Congress has also authorized Sallie Mae to resign government 
partnership to become a fully private institution in 2008. See James Politi, 
Sallie Mae Gains $ 31bn Financing, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2008), https://www.ft.
com/content/5b95dc94-cda6-11dc-9e4e-000077b07658. 
 69. For an analysis of the methodological challenges of valuing the 
subsidies, see Ron Feldman, Estimating and Managing the Federal Subsidy of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Is Either Task Possible?, 11 J. PUB. BUDGETING, 
ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 81, 83 (1999); Edward J. Kane, Housing Finance GSEs: 
Who Gets the Subsidy, 15 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 197, 197 (1999). 
 70. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T OFF. PUB. AFF., FACT SHEET: TREASURY SENIOR 
PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Documents/pspa_factsheet_090708%20hp1128.pdf. 
 71. See USHA C.V. HALEY & GEORGE T. HALEY, SUBSIDIES TO CHINESE 
INDUSTRY: STATE CAPITALISM, BUSINESS STRATEGY, AND TRADE POLICY 24 
(2013) (explaining that the two best-known GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, were placed into government conservatorship at the height of the 2008–09 
financial crisis). But cf. Lin & Milhaupt, supra note 17 (providing an analysis of 
the Chinese SOEs as a “networked hierarchy” with deep connections to the 
party-state). 
 72. These companies include: National Railroad Passenger Corporation 
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federal budget appropriations, but some have independent 
sources of income. 
The companies acquired by the federal government are a 
separate set of companies that were neither initially created nor 
controlled by the federal government, but of which the 
government has taken ownership in order to operate them itself. 
They are in two categories: 
 the Incidental Governmental Corporations (IGCs): these 
companies are temporarily in the possession of the 
government by the capture effect of the property of a 
defaulter of the government, such as the offending 
companies with the tax authorities or an inability to repay 
funds that were advanced to them for the supply of 
products and services not rendered to the government; 
usually, they are waiting for a legal tender and are too 
small to be rated individually, especially because their 
survival time is short; and 
 the companies acquired by the government (government-
acquired corporations, or GACs): these are companies 
whose shares and/or assets were purchased by the 
Federal Government, because of the fact that these 
companies were found to be strategic and “too big to fail” 
 
(Amtrak), Tennessee Valley Authority, Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, St. Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Corporation for National 
and Community Service (AmeriCorps), Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, Federal Reserve Legal Services Corporation, United States Postal 
Service Conrail (former), Resolution Trust Corporation, and Panama Canal 
Commission. See EDWIN M. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 
1860 (1954); JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW 
MAKERS (1950); JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN 
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 1 (1956) [hereinafter HURST, 
CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM]; JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1960). See also JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-
1915 (1974) [hereinafter HURST, LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN]; JAMES W. 
HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1977); for a 
comprehensive bibliography of works by and about Hurst, see Ronald Eskin & 
Robert Hayden, James Willard Hurst (b. 1910) Bibliography, 10 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 325 (1975). Corporations were legislative creatures and thus, within the 
limits discussed here, they were subject to regulation by their chartering states. 
To a lesser degree, they were also subject to regulation by the states in which 
they sought to do business. During the early nineteenth century, the states were 
the only significant source of charters. Until the 1860s, the federal government 
chartered only two corporations. Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the 
American Economic Order, 1789-1910, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 57 (1975). 
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or, in other words, that their liquidation would present too 
high a systemic risk to the overall economy of the United 
States to allow such companies to be liquidated, declared 
bankrupt, or simply to cease to provide their services. 
These companies include Citigroup, General Motors, and 
AIG (American International Group).73 
There is a second level of sovereign government in the 
United States after the federal government, namely, the 
different states of the Federation that make up the country. 
State governments are legally sovereign entities and they owe 
their sovereign existence to the sovereign people of their land 
who created and wrote their State Constitution; they are not 
corporate bodies, since they were not created by the achievement 
of the federal government and they exist with or without the 
consent of the federal government. As sovereign, they have the 
power to detain the “radical title” to the land, and to exercise the 
four fundamental powers (raising taxes, “eminent domain”, 
police power, and exemption) as well as various other powers 
(including the power to grant charters). The vast majority of non-
government corporations in the United States are regulated by 
the states and not by the federal government; this includes most 
charities (although some of national reputation are regulated by 
the federal government and not by a state government), non-
profit corporations, and corporations for profit.74 States, as 
sovereign, also have the power to organize and regulate the 
companies they own, for which they exercise control and have 
responsibility for financing and directing. This includes: 
 municipal corporations (MCs): these are public companies 
that have a vested democratic control over local affairs in 
a given geographic area (they exist in villages, cities, 
suburbs, towns or counties).75 Although these municipal 
 
 73. See generally Kevin Kosar, Federal Government Corporations: An 
Overview, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (June 8, 2011) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
RL30365.pdf (defining federal government corporations and explaining their 
characteristics). See also Martin Arnold, Citigroup Tops List of Global Banks 
Posing Systemic Risk, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/
3e7f5e1a-afe1-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0. 
 74. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the United States, Facts Sheet (Jan. 20, 
2017) https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/266904.htm. 
 75. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 
1109 (1980). See Gerald E. Frug, A Legal History of Cities, in LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHIES READER 154 (Blomley et al. eds., 2001), for an updated and 
condensed version. See JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 16 (5th ed., 1911), for a contemporaneous analysis. 
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corporations are often regulated and sometimes funded by 
the state government, and can often collect local taxes, 
they are public entities vested with limited scope and non-
sovereign, and the state government that regulates them 
is not legally responsible for their debts in the event of a 
municipal bankruptcy; and 
 regulated companies and state-owned (state-owned and -
chartered corporations, or SCOCs): these are numerous 
and provide various public services. Examples include 
North Dakota Mill and Elevator or South Dakota Public 
Broadcasting.76 Generally speaking, a status document 
passed by a state legislature authorizes a company owned 
by the government to support a public service mission 
with funds or public property.77 Lottery companies are 
also owned by the state governments, such as the Georgia 
Lottery Corporation and many others.78 
There is a third level of sovereign government in the United 
States, namely, the tribal governments of Native Americans. 
The Native American tribes are included as former sovereignty 
established by the sovereign people since time immemorial and 
recognized as sovereign by the federal government of the United 
States (as well as that of various states).79 As such, Native 
American tribal governments (and Native Alaskans) have 
specific rights to sovereignty, which include the power to detain 
the “radical title” to the land, to exercise the four fundamental 
powers (taxes, “eminent domain,” police power, and waiver) as 
well as other powers, such as that of regulating companies and 
supporting public tasks that can benefit their tribal citizens, 
Native Americans and Native Alaskans who are also citizens of 
 
 76. The North Dakota Mill and Elevator Association began operating 
October 22, 1922, as a value-added market for wheat produced in North Dakota, 
which now adds value to 23 million bushels of North Dakota spring and durum 
wheat annually by selling wheat products to various bakeries, pasta customers, 
and food service suppliers—providing the state with an annual payroll of $7 
million. About Us, N.D. MILL, https://www.ndmill.com/index.cfm/about/about-
us/ (last visited February 10, 2018). 
 77. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) in the United States: Facts Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 
(Jan. 20, 2017) https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/266904.htm. 
 78. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-27-4 (West 1992) (“[T]he Georgia Lottery 
Corporation which shall be deemed to be an instrumentality of the state, and 
not a state agency, and a public corporation.”). 
 79. See Tribal Governance, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS (NCAI) 
http://www.ncai.org/policy-issues/tribal-governance.  
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their respective states and also United States citizens.80 Native 
Alaskans are particularly advanced in the exercise of their tribal 
sovereignty in incorporating companies held by and for the 
benefit of their tribal citizens and to compete in the highly 
competitive economic sectors via the Alaska Native Regional 
Corporations.81 The Native American tribes in the interior forty-
eight states use their sovereignty and their ability to regulate 
and organize it by using regulatory facilitation. Many tribes 
have taken advantage of the Federal Native 8(a) Contracting 
Program which allows companies owned by the federally 
recognized tribes (SOEs) to participate in Federal contracting 
and receive economic benefits from the United States federal 
government.82 Some of these small businesses have proven to be 
successful for tribal sovereign Native American and tribal 
societies after being included in federal initiatives, finally 
creating a successful federal economic program that works for 
Native Americans.83 
3. France’s State Capitalism 
Industrial and commercial activities undertaken by the 
administration are entrusted to public companies.84 It is, for 
France, a body with legal personality in the public sector with a 
possibility of private sector participation. There is no unique 
status of the public company. Thus, there are a number of 
different types of operations: 
 an établissement public à caractère industriel et 
commercial (Public Establishment in the Field of 
 
 80. See Jessica A. Shoemaker, Complicity’s Shadow: American Indian 
Property, Soveriegnty, and the Future, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 487, 489 (2017); 
Stephan Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes 95, 98, 99, 174, 314 (4th ed. 
2012). 
 81. See Alaska Native Corporations, RESOURCE DEV. COUNCIL, 
http://www.akrdc.org/alaska-native-corporations (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
 82. See Native Am. Contractors Ass’n, What is the Native 8(a) Contracting 
Program? https://www.chenega.com/Media/Default/Native%208(a)/NACA%
20brochure%20re%208(a)%20program.pdf. 
 83. See In Support of Native American Full Participation in the Small 
Business Administration’s 8(A) Business Development Program, NCAI, Res. 
SPO-16-059 (June 30, 2016) http://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/in-
support-of-native-american-full-participation-in-the-small-business-
administration-s-8-a-business-development-program. See also Native Am. 
Contractors Ass’n, supra note 82. 
 84. See Mojuyé, supra note 31. 
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Commercial and Industrial Sectors)85 (or EPIC) is a 
category of public undertaking in France. It is subject to 
public law, it is not open to the securities market and it 
lacks capital86 EPICs are public agencies in the meaning 
of public law when acting in the commercial and 
industrial sectors.87 They can be represented either by 
mixed companies jointly held by public and private 
entities but are not subject to general law or by national 
companies, whose equity capital is fully held by the state; 
 domestic companies under private law but whose capital 
is wholly owned by the state; and 
 companies of mixed economy of private companies in 
which the state or local governments invest, but do not 
have half the capital (Article L. 1522-1 CGCL.).88 
Sometimes the state transforms an EPIC into a national 
company then sells shares (privatization). Thus, EPICs become 
public companies, which in turn, private companies invests in. 
Most public companies have been public since the 1945 
nationalization.89 The state sold a portion of these investments 
in 1986, and this initiated a large wave of privatizations under 
the government of Jacques Chirac, and slow and incremental 
sales in the years 1990 and 2003 (and others) by waves of 
privatization, which allowed some companies to recapitalize (to 
increase EDF’s capital, for example), to open certain sectors to 
 
85. Sébastien Martin, The Difficulties Faced By Public Establishments In 
Light Of Competition Law: A Discussion Of The “La Poste” Case, MONTESQUIEU 
L. REV. Jan. 2015, at 108, 109 http://www.montesquieulawreview.eu/lr1_
content/mlr1.pdf (“On this basis, as for all other public-law entities in France 
but unlike private companies, both La Poste and France Telecom do not have 
any share capital and are not subject to the ordinary law on receivership and 
judicial winding-up of firms in difficulty. As is emphasised [sic] in French legal 
doctrine, “the particularities of the legal regime for some state-owned companies 
remain linked to the fact that, behind a uniform title drawn from business law, 
there indeed remains the specific strength of the public-law nature of those 
companies that take the form of public entities.”). 
 86. Id.  
 87. See generally Serving the Public, SNCF, http://www.sncf.com/sncv1/
en/meet-sncf/epic-status (describing an EPIC). 
 88. CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAV.] [LABOR CODE] art. L. 1522-1 (Fr.). 
 89. France nationalized Renault in 1945, Charbonnages de France, 
Electricité de France, and Gaz de France in 1946, and for a brief time under the 
presidency of Mitterrand, France also nationalized a large part of the banking 
sector and industries of strategic importance to the state (1982–1986). See Paul 
Cohen, Lessons from the Nationalization Nation: State-Owned Enterprises in 
France, DISSENT MAG., Winter 2010, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/
lessons-from-the-nationalization-nation-state-owned-enterprises-in-france. 
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competition (e.g., France Telecom) and to reduce the budget 
deficit to slow the progression of the French public debt.90 For 
listed companies, the state gradually reduced its participation 
by small successive sales. These SOEs include: 
 Thales: In December 2015, the public sector accounts for 
26% of the shares, the individual and institutional 
shareholder accounts for 46% of the shares;91 
 SNPE: 100% in 2005, total current privatization in 2011;92 
 Areva: 95% in 2005, 28.83% in 201793 and 
 EDF: 100% in 2005, 84.94% in 2017.94 
Many public companies are owned by local authorities; for 
example, the City of Paris owns eighteen semi-public 
companies.95 Local authorities sometimes undertake joint 
control with the state, as in the case of the Compagnie Nationale 
du Rhône (CNR).96 
II. THE REGULATION OF STATE CAPITALISM 
INVESTMENTS 
State capitalism is diverse and on the rise. Practically, it 
means that the volume of international investments made by 
SCEs is increasing, thus rendering international norms on the 
protection of foreign investment increasingly significant. 
International investment law provides rules to ensure access for 
foreign investment to host country markets and to protect 
 
 90. See Mojuyé, supra note 31, at 81. 
 91. Shareholders and Board of Directors, THALES, https://www.thales
group.com/en/global/corporate-responsibility/governance/shareholders-and-
board-directors (last visited May 5, 2018). 
 92. See Michel Berne & Gérard Pogorel, Privatization Experience in France, 
in CEDIFO DICE REP. 36, table 3 (2005), https://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/
dicereport105-forum5.pdf. See also http://www.privatizationbarometer.com/
database.php (last visit 14 Apr. 2018). 
 93. Berne & Pogorel, supra note 92; France - 7-State-Owned Enterprises 
(Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.export.gov/article?id=France-Competition-from-
State-Owned-Enterprises. 
 94. Berne & Pogorel, supra note 92; France - 7-State-Owned Enterprises, 
supra note 93. 
 95. See Real Estate Dev. Servs., Mixed Economy Companies, Local Public 
Companies and Public Companies: Local Development City of Paris (2016) (in 
French) https://api-site-cdn.paris.fr/images/98230. 
 96. See Vincent Guérard & Vincent Trévisani, L’ouverture a la concurrence 
du marché français de l’éctricité: une révolution en marche [The Opening of the 
French Electricity Market to Competition: A Revolution is Underway], 2 INT’L 
BUS. L.J. 123, 131 (2003); see also Mojuyé, supra note 31. 
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investment against risk (especially political risk). It creates a 
specific set of investment protection obligations on host 
countries, including protection against expropriation without 
compensation and it gives access to financial compensation 
through investor–state arbitration when the host country has 
breached a protection obligation.97 
Unfortunately, as of today, there is no comprehensive 
multilateral agreements on investment, either under the ambit 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) or anywhere else. Under 
the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, the possibility of 
negotiations on investment was originally included in 2001 but 
it was dropped in 2004.98 There was a prior attempt to negotiate 
a multilateral investment agreement (MIA) between OECD 
countries as a plurilateral agreement, but these negotiations 
ended without success in 1997.99 Hence, international rules on 
investment are fragmented and there are a wide variety of 
obligations. Customary international law100 is applicable to 
investment but its content is limited and disputed. The WTO 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreement does 
mention investment, but it is a very limited agreement, dealing 
only with investment rules that have an impact on trade in goods 
that is contrary to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).101 It mainly prohibits performance requirements that 
are contrary to national treatment (NT) of goods (such as local 
sourcing requirements) or by the creation of a quota on goods.102 
The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
under Mode-3 Commitments on commercial presence, applies to 
some kinds of investment in services.103 The main source of 
 
 97. See also OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in 
International Investment Law (OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, Paper No. 3, 2004), https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/WP-2004_3.pdf. 
 98. General Council, Decision on the Doha Work Programme, ¶ 1(g), WTO 
Doc. WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004). 
 99. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/globalization-of-the-economy-2-
1/multilateral-agreement-on-investment-2-5.html. 
 100. Customary international law is the law that develops from the 
consistent practice of states that have an appropriate sense of legal obligation. 
See Tarcisio Gazzini, The Role of Customary International Law in the Field of 
Foreign Investment, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 691 (2007). 
 101. See Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, WORLD TRADE 
ORG. [WTO], https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_info_e.htm. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS): Objectives, 
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international investment law is contained in other treaties, 
sometimes called IIAs, which include Preferential Trade and 
Investment Agreements (PTIAs) that address investment, and 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). These provide more 
comprehensive rules on investment. IIAs also include double 
taxation agreements (DTAs).104 
A. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
In principle, the treatment of international investment is 
defined by domestic law, that is to say the law of the state of the 
investment of territoriality.105 Thus, an investment host state 
makes the rules and regulations applicable to investments 
according to the desired orientation, incentive, or disincentive. 
Exporting countries of investment, for most developed countries 
are favorable to domestic law mechanisms because they allow 
them greater concessions in terms of treatment and protection 
from the state of territoriality.106 For their part, importing 
 
Coverages, and Disciplines, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
gatsqa_e.htm. 
 104. Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An 
Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS xxvii (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). See 
generally Zachary Elkins et. al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 60 INT’L ORG. 811, 814–15 (2006) (“The United 
States embraced BITs later than did its West European counterparts. Between 
1962 and 1972, during which time West Germany entered into forty-six BITs 
and Switzerland entered into twenty-seven, the United States eschewed such 
treaties and signed only two Friendship Commerce and Navigation Treaties—
with Togo and Thailand. One reason for the delayed U.S. participation in 
bilateral arrangements may have been the hope of retaining a multilateral 
approach. The United States was one of the most aggressive proponents of the 
Hull Rule and may have feared that BITs represented a threat to its claim that 
investment was already protected under customary international law. 
Moreover, potential hosts may have had incentives to resist the relatively 
onerous provisions the United States government typically tried to secure. One 
of the prime differences between the terms typically offered by the Europeans 
and the United States at this time was the former’s emphasis on investment 
protection and the latter’s additional insistence on liberalization.”). 
 105. For a critical account of the current investment arbitration regime, see 
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 19 (2008); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES (2009). See also, Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, 
Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010). 
 106. See generally Benjamin K. Guthrie, Beyond Investment Protection: An 
Examination of The Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule 
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countries investments, often those of developing countries, are 
favorable to the mechanisms of international law, because the 
use of an international interest allows them to mitigate the 
concessions would welcome the state of nationality 
investment.107 This feature was debated in a lively way during 
the 1960s, and it was the cause of the proliferation of 
conventional instruments on the treatment and protection of 
investments.108 In general, a treaty invariably stipulates that 
the host country should pay for investment once it is established 
in its territory. Very often bilateral treaties include one or more 
general principles, together or individually, which are intended 
to provide global criteria through which it is possible to judge 
whether the treatment accorded to an investment is satisfactory; 
the principles also help to interpret special situations when 
applied to more specific provisions.109 The treatment of 
investments is defined as “the set of principles and rules of 
international law as national law governing the regime of 
international investment, since the moment of its formation 
until its liquidation.”110 
 
 
of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL., 1151 (2013) (discussing the existing models 
of interaction between BITs and domestic rule of law, including the complement 
model, the substitute model and the limits of both). See also Richard C. Chen, 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Domestic Institutional Reform, 55 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 547 (2016-2017). 
 107. See S.K. Dholakia, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing 
Countries: What Now and What Next - Impact of White Industries v. Coal India 
Award, 2 INDIAN J. ARB. L. 4 (2013). See also Eric Gottwald, Leveling the 
Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing Nations 
in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 237 (2006-2007). 
 108. See, e.g. M. Sornarajah, The New International Economic Order, 
Investment Treaties and Foreign Investment Law in ASEAN, 27 Malaya L. Rev. 
440 (1985). 
 109. See, e.g. JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION UNDER 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2014); Lorenzo 
Cotula, Do Investment Treaty Unduly Constrain Regulatory Space?, QUESTIONS 
OF INT’L L. 9 (2014); J. PEDRO MARTINEZ-FRAGA & C. RYAN REETZ, PUBLIC 
PURPOSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: RETHINKING REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY IN 
THE GLOBAL ERA (2014); William Schreiber, Realizing the Right to Water in 
International Investment Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach to bit 
Obligations, 48 (1) NAT. RESOURCES J. 431 (2008); Howard Mann, Implications 
of International Trade and Investment Agreements for Water and Water 
Services: Some Responses from Other Sources of International Law, 5 
Transnational Dispute Management (2006); Gus Van Harten, Five 
Justifications for Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2 (1) TRADE, L. & 
DEV. 19 (2010). 
 110. See Rudolf Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on 
Domestic Administrative Law, 37(4) N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 953,954 (2005). 
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The general standards of treatment found systematically in 
a bilateral agreement include absolute norms and standards.111 
This generally means that the absolute standards are those that 
set out the treatment to be given.112 The standards define the 
required treatment by reference to the treatment accorded to 
other investments. However, it should be noted that “absolute” 
terms and “relative” terms are not universally accepted. 
Generally, bilateral treaties can therefore include several 
provisions on absolute standards for the treatment to be 
accorded. BITs provide several clauses that are part of the 
absolute standard of treatment accorded to investments.113 
These provisions for the FET, full protection and security, the 
prohibition of arbitrary or discriminatory measures and 
treatment in accordance with international law, and one or more 
provisions relating to the treatment.114 BITs use two different 
terms in order to prevent the discriminatory treatment of 
investments. These are the Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause 
and the NT standard. We discuss below the applicability of these 
two types of treatment in bilateral treaties, as well as exceptions 
to these two treatment standards.115 
A major reason why many developed countries took the 
initiative to conclude bilateral treaties during the 1960s was to 
protect their investments abroad. Investment protection is 
defined as “the set of principles and rules of international law as 
of national law, which have the object or effect of preventing or 
suppressing any public affect the existence or the consistency of 
 
 111. See Stephen Jagusch & Nicole Duclos, Compensation for the Breach of 
Relative Standards of Treaty Protection, 10 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 515, 516 
(2009). 
 112. Moshe Hirsch, Conflicting Obligations in International Investment 
Law: Investment Tribunals’ Perspective, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF 
AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY 
AND SUBSIDIARITY 323, 324–5 (T. Broude & Y. Shany eds., Hart 2008). 
 113. See Jesse Kennedy, Autocatalysis in Investment Treaty Law, 47 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 1035 (2015-2016). 
 114. See id.; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty 
Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201 (1988). 
 115. See Julien Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate 
Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and 
Arbitration, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 225 (2015). See also Giorgio Sacerdoti, BIT 
Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to Their Coverage, the Impact of 
Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defense of Necessity, 28 ICSID REV. 
351, 382 (2013); see also Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International 
Investment and Domestic Health Protections—Is a General Exceptions Clause 
as a Forced Perspective, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332, 358–59 (2013). 
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international investment.”116 The protection regime is 
intimately linked to the notion of permanent sovereignty, and its 
rules and principles laid down by the domestic law of the state 
of the investment of territoriality, cover all the problems of 
expropriation and nationalization. Thus, the States of investors, 
especially in developed countries, do not want to depend on 
choices made by the South. Therefore, the clauses designed to 
protect investments in the bilateral treaties are of particular 
importance. These are, in general, the provisions designed: (1) to 
prevent investments against expropriation; (2) against war and 
civil unrest; (3) for the transfer of payments; (4) for specific 
protection clauses; and (5) also other provisions concerning the 
general exceptions. 
This increased importance of IIAs necessitates an 
understanding of the scope of their application, with which a 
state must comply. The most important issues of comprehension 
related to the scope of application in IIAs include the following: 
what is the definition of “investor” and “investment?117 When 
 
 116. Julien Chaisse & Lisa Li, Shareholder Protection Reloaded Redesigning 
The Matrix Of Shareholder Claims For Reflective Loss, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 
61 (2016). 
 117. Treaty obligations only apply to the “investments” of “investors,” as 
defined in the treaty. Julien Chaisse, Renewables Re-energized? The 
Internationalization of Green Energy Investment Rules and Disputes, 
9 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 269 (2016). The key question is: who is an 
investor and what is an investment? To address this question, countries should 
think about the following issues: What kind of investments will benefit from the 
treaty obligation? Generally, capital exporting states would like to have a broad 
definition to ensure that their investors are protected regardless of the form of 
their investment. Host states may be concerned that a broad definition of 
investment may create a substantial risk of investor–state claims. Host states 
may also be concerned about whether there are any areas of state policy that 
would be affected by the scope of the definition. For example, some countries 
would not like to include state debt obligations in order to have flexibility to 
deal with such obligations in the face of a balance-of-payments crisis. What type 
of investment would a state like to attract? Does a host state want to attract 
FDI or portfolio or both? Most IIA definitions extend the scope of the agreement 
to a much broader conception of investment. Commonly a broad definition is 
adopted in IIAs which is called an “Open Ended Definition” that includes every 
kind of asset (even intellectual property, etc.). More recently a “Closed Ended 
Definition” has also been introduced in IIAs which limits investment to 
categories that are specified in a list. In such cases, however, sometimes the list 
could be quite long. In both cases, the definition may or may not require that 
investment must possess the characteristics of classical concept of investment 
to qualify for protection. The Malaysia-Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership 
2007 does require that some of these characteristics are present. See Malaysia-
Pakistan Closer Economic Partnership Agreement, Malaysia-Pak., art. 88(1)(d), 
Nov. 8, 2007, http://fta.miti.gov.my/miti-fta/resources/auto%20download%20
images/55892379ea5d1.pdf (“Where an asset lacks the characteristics of an 
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should the treaty obligations start? Does the treaty cover only 
new investments after the treaty is in place, or is it also valid for 
existing investments? When does the treaty obligation end? 
Upon termination of the treaty should the obligations end or 
continue for a specified period of time for existing investments? 
B. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
(GATS) 
As discussed in the Introduction, the controversy over SCEs 
is essentially about the interaction of two very different concepts 
of the role of government in a capitalist economy, i.e., state 
capitalism as opposed to market capitalism. There is a potential 
for abuse or corruption where elements of state capitalism 
interfere in a tradition of market capitalism. This may arguably 
be created by the greater proximity an SCE creates between 
governments and the private sector. This particularly applies to 
services like banks.118 If an SCE cannot directly rely on the WTO 
dispute procedure, its close connection to the government may 
be presumed as rendering the claim natural by its government 
against a host country.119 
 
investment, that asset is not an investment regardless of the form it may take. 
The characteristics of an investment include the commitment of capital, the 
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”). Article 88 requires 
that in addition to Open Ended Definition, there is a Qualification Note to be 
applied for eligibility of an investment. Id.  
 118. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) has already strongly invested 
in this financial sector; a growing network of interlinked investments between 
banks and other financial firms within China and overseas can be assumed. In 
practice, CIC’s investment in companies such as Morgan Stanley may provide 
them with unfair preferential access to China’s domestic financial markets, or, 
in return, overseas financial firms may be put under pressure to treat Chinese 
companies in global business preferentially compared to others. Neutrality of 
the business sector and a level playing field for MNEs worldwide is at stake. 
Julien Chaisse et al., Managing India’s Foreign Exchange Reserve: Managing 
India’s Foreign Exchange Reserve: An Exploration of the SWF Temptation, 
INDIAN J. INT’L ECON. L. 2010 (3), 20. 
 119. The WTO agreements provide extensive rights and impose many 
obligations on its members and on their conduct of international trade. A key 
issue is how the WTO assesses and enforces those rights and duties. A critical 
part of any enforcement mechanism is an effective system to resolve disputes 
over what the rules mean and whether they have been broken in a specific case. 
This is essential to promote compliance with these rules. Article XXIII of the 
GATT 1994 and the DSU set out the basic institutional and jurisdictional scope 
of WTO dispute resolution. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 
23, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153, https://www.wto.org/
english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT]; see also Understanding 
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There is little doubt that WTO GATS does apply to potential 
SCEs’ investments. The GATS mostly concerns investment 
issues of all the existing WTO agreements. Although GATS does 
not deal officially with investment, it covers FDI through its 
commercial presence.120 This Section will answer two questions: 
does the GATS apply to SCE operations, and, if yes, is it possible 
to have investment disputes at the WTO? 
Also, some countries have explicitly excluded foreign 
government ownership from the scope of their GATS 
commitments in a few sectors. The United States’ commitment 
states that government-owned or government-controlled 
insurance companies, whether domestic or foreign, are not 
authorized to conduct business in a large number of states, and 
in basic telecommunications, radio, and television broadcast 
services licenses may not be granted to or held by foreign 
governments or the representatives thereof.121 In the sector of 
audiovisual services and the sub-sector of “Radio and Television 
Transmission Services.” the United States has set some 
restrictions on the nature of the foreign investors, and these 
implicitly exclude SOEs from the said sector.122 The United 
 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, annex II, Apr. 
15 1994, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf. The latter 
document has established a unified and compulsory dispute settlement 
mechanism for all covered agreements adopted under the umbrella of the WTO. 
Id. It comprehensively codifies the relevant procedural rules and guidelines. 
The same core principles apply to any dispute across all agreements and 
subject-matters (with only few exceptions of special or additional rules 
contained in covered agreements applicable as lex specialis only to disputes 
arising under that agreement). Fundamentally, the mechanism is explicitly 
designed to promote the rule of law and to provide security and predictability 
to the multilateral trading system. Hence, it ensures that the approach taken 
by panels and the Appellate Body is of an essentially legal nature. The WTO 
does not grant direct access to its work or meetings for any actor other than the 
members. This holds equally true for dispute settlement proceedings to which 
only members can formally become a party. Private actors and individuals such 
as industries, consumers and NGOs cannot initiate a formal dispute resolution 
proceeding, let alone have standing before panels or the Appellate Body. 
Governments alone decide whether a complaint shall be brought before the 
WTO dispute settlement system. This mechanism reflects classical diplomatic 
protection of individuals and groups by nation states as developed under 
general public international law. 
 120. The GATS modes of supply are: cross-border supply, consumption 
abroad, commercial presence, and the movement of natural persons. See Modes 
of Supply, UN TRADE STATISTICS, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/50665/Modes-of-Supply. 
 121. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, U.S. SCHEDULE OF COMMITMENTS UNDER 
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 55 (1998). 
 122. Id. at 47. 
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States schedules state: 
Radio and television licences may not be held by: a 
foreign government; a corporation chartered under the 
law of a foreign country or which has a non-U.S. citizen 
as an officer or director or more than 20 per cent of the 
capital stock of which is owned or voted by non-U.S. 
citizens; a corporation chartered under the laws of the 
United States that is directly or indirectly controlled by 
a corporation more than 25 per cent of whose capital 
stock is owned by non-U.S. citizens or a foreign 
government or a corporation of which any officer or more 
than 25 per cent of the directors are non-US citizens.123 
In the sector of financial services, as with all subsectors, 
“[f]oreign ownership of Edge corporations is limited to foreign 
banks and US subsidiaries of foreign banks, while domestic non-
bank firms may own such corporations.”124 
The establishment of a commercial presence relates 
substantially and directly to investment. As long as a SCE 
decides to invest in a WTO country member (i.e., the United 
States or the EU), and if it is in the services sector, GATS is a 
relevant legal instrument to use. 
It is only by reference to a country’s schedule, and its MFN 
exemption list, that it can be seen which services sectors and 
under what conditions the basic principles of the GATS (Market 
access, NT, and MFN treatment) apply within that country’s 
jurisdiction. A specific commitment in a services schedule is an 
undertaking to provide market access and NT for the service 
activity in question on the terms and conditions specified in the 
schedule.125 The commitments made in the field of “commercial 
presence” are important since with the constitutional principle 
of obligation, parties to GATS are committed to treating services 
and service providers from one member in a no less favorable 
way than like services and service providers from any other as 
concerns measures affecting trade in services.126 NT is, however, 
 
 123. Id. at 48. 
 124. Id. at 64. 
 125. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the 
List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/serv_e/guide1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 126. The wording of MFN treatment in GATS is the same as in NAFTA and 
the United States BITs, using the negative list approach, once it states that 
with respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each member shall 
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not automatically accorded across the board. It applies only for 
scheduled sectors when the parties agree to provide NT in the 
context of specific market access commitments.127 GATS also 
states that a member may maintain a measure inconsistent with 
MFN treatment provided that such a measure is listed in, and 
meets the conditions of the Annex on Article II Exemptions.128 
The GATS does not set out any operational conditions 
directly. The host countries continue to regulate foreign 
investment through their domestic legislation (as discussed 
above) and not by directly imposing obligations on foreign 
investors in IIAs. Nevertheless, there are some general 
obligations within GATS that certainly affect the investment 
operational conditions. Such obligations are: domestic 
regulation, recognition, monopolies and exclusive service 
suppliers, and business practice obligations.129 
The domestic regulation affects the operation of investment 
mostly through an authorization process, qualification 
requirements, technical standards and licensing requirements, 
where these conditions and procedures are required for the 
supply of a service. The obligations of recognition affect 
investment in the supply of a service, where services suppliers 
need to meet standards or criteria for the authorization, 
licensing, or certification of their services, or where they need to 
achieve special education or experience.130 The obligation on 
monopolies and exclusive service suppliers within the 
Agreement states that each member shall ensure that any 
monopoly supplier of a service in its territory does not act in a 
manner inconsistent with the MFN treatment principle.131 If a 
supplier fulfills the condition on monopoly and exclusive service 
supplier, then this Agreement will certainly affect the operation 
of his or her investment in order not to allow such a supplier to 
abuse its monopoly position. Regarding the obligations on 
business practices, the Agreement appeals the members to 
eliminate certain business practices of service suppliers that 
 
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any 
other member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services 
and service suppliers of any other country. 
 127. Guide to Reading the GATS Schedules of Specific Commitments and the 
List of Article II (MFN) Exemptions, supra note 125. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Jan. 1, 1995, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS]. 
 130. Id. art. 7. 
 131. Id. art. 8. 
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may restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in services. 
III. STATE CONTROLLED ENTITIES AS 
CLAIMANTS: LEGAL STANDING UNDER 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 
As this Article previously discussed, SCEs from China, 
France and the United States are increasingly active in 
transnational investment operations. Simultaneously, the role 
of international investment agreements reaches a level never 
known in its history. This creates new legal questions as none of 
these rules of international law are designed to regulate foreign 
public investments and indirectly the activities of SCEs. In 
particular, the global regime for international investment was 
not thought to be designed to allow SCEs to act as a claimant 
before an international tribunal. However, that question is now 
a reality, challenging the fundamentals of international law. 
The Investor State Dispute Settlement is a particular 
feature of IIAs which differentiates them from all other types of 
treaties.132 Investors from one party state are permitted to seek 
financial compensation from the other party state through 
binding arbitration on the grounds that the other has failed to 
comply with its obligations under the treaty.133 
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the number of cases launched now 
exceeds 550.134 These disputes have been filed with the 
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID)135 (or the ICSID Additional Facility) which has dealt 
with the largest number of disputes.136 ICSID arbitration 
 
 132. See Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice, supra note 115. 
 133. It fulfills investors’ needs in the following ways. It avoids exposure of 
the investor to the uncertainties of host state laws and regulation by creating a 
separate treaty-based set of rules to govern host state’s conduct. It gives 
investors an alternative to the host state’s judicial system to seek relief from 
the host state’s actions. An investor can determine when there has been a 
breach of a treaty obligation and launch a claim. It is unnecessary for an 
investor to rely on its home state espousing its claim. There may be various 
reasons why a state may not want to make a claim against another state in 
diplomatic relations. Julien Chaisse & Dini Sejko, Investor-State Arbitration 
Distorted: When the Claimant Is a State, in JUDGING THE STATE IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW: SOVEREIGNTY MODERN, THE 
LAW AND THE ECONOMICS 86 (Leïla Choukroune ed. 2016). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 86 n.36. 
 136. Database of ICSID Member States, WORLD BANK, https://icsid.world
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possesses have several characteristics that make it particularly 
attractive for investors. For instance, an ICSID award is not 
subject to any review not foreseen in the ICSID Convention, and 
it is to be recognized by the contracting states as if it were a final 
judgment of a court in that state.137 In addition, host states have 
a strong incentive to comply with ICSID awards because of the 
institutional link of ICSID to the World Bank.138 
The concept of ‘legal standing’ refers to the ability of a party 
to demonstrate to the court/dispute resolution institution 
sufficient connection to and harm from the law/treaty or action 
challenged to support that party’s participation in the case.139 
Most investment treaties offer a solution that gives independent 
standing to shareholders: the treaties include shareholding or 
participation in a company in their definition of ‘investment’.140 
Mark Feldman identified that the disputes between investor and 
State within the scope of investment treaty protections are 
reflected in both the ICSID and in BITs.141 The ICSID was 
intended to fill a narrow procedural gap that existed between 
State-to-State and private disputes and facilitate the settlement 
of disputes arising from private, but not public, foreign 
 
bank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 
2007); Hernando Otero & Omar García-Bolívar, International Arbitration 
between Foreign Investors and Host States, HAUSER GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL 
PROGRAM http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/International_Arbitration_
Foreign_Investors_Host_States.html. See Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the 
BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. 
WORLD INV. & TRADE 229, 231 (2004) (pointing out that most BITs refer to 
ICSID). More than 140 states are parties to the ICSID Convention. List of 
Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (Nov. 4, 2007), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/icsiddocs/Documents/List%20of%
20Contracting%20States%20and%20Other%20Signatories%20of%20the%20C
onvention%20-%20Latest.pdf. Investment disputes may also be settled under 
the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, and ad-hoc arbitration. 
 137. See Chaisse & Sejko, supra note 133 , at 87. 
 138. See ICSID and the World Bank Group, ICSID, https://icsid.
worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/ICSID%20And%20The%20World%20Bank%20
Group.aspx (describing ICSID as one of the five organizations of the World 
Bank). 
 139. See Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 140. See DOLZER & SCHRUER, supra note 105, at 57. 
 141. See Mark Feldman, The Standing of State-Owned Entities Under 
Investment Treaties, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & 
POLICY 615 (Andrew K. Bjorklund ed. 2012). 
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investment.142 Therefore, the “legal standing” in the context of 
investment arbitration is based on thousands of BITs and the 
ICSID Convention. Those investment arbitrations are mostly to 
take place in the ICSID (i.e. an international arbitration 
institution which facilitates legal dispute resolution and 
conciliation between international investors). In this Section, 
the Article reviews the most important cases brought to 
arbitration dealing with the issue of SCEs legal standing (For a 
detailed summary of all cases, including pending cases, see 
Annex 1). 
Standing is a material question in all cases. SCEs may be 
reluctant to submit disputes to such arbitral panels without 
assurances that the panels would confer jurisdiction. By way of 
example, Temasek Holdings, the sovereign wealth arm of 
Singapore, apparently chose not to submit a dispute with 
Indonesia over telecom investments to an international 
investment dispute process despite (a) the existence of a BIT 
between the two states, and (b) the implication in the new 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement that sovereign 
wealth fund investors should be treated similarly to private 
foreign investors for BIT purposes.143 
A. AN INVESTOR BY ANY NAME? 
One of the most important issues in an investment treaty is 
to define who is an investor whose rights are protected under the 
treaty.144 Investors must be related to the state party to the 
treaty other than the one complained against. This arrangement 
must be the case to benefit from the investor protection 
obligations in the host state.145 The issue to be addressed is what 
 
 142. See id. 
 143. See, e.g., P.R. Venkat, Indonesia Fines Temasek $1.7 Million, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/indonesia-fines-temasek-
17-million-2011-01-18 (reporting on the result of Temasek’s submission of 
claims to an Indonesian domestic court). 
 144. For an example definition of “investor” see Agreement Between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of South Africa for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-S. Afr., art. I, Nov. 27, 1995, 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CAN_Southafrica_e.
asp. 
 145. BITs offer foreign investors a unique dispute settlement mechanism to 
enforce the rights given to them by the investment treaties. This unique 
element of investment treaties provides an investor with the possibility of 
bringing a direct claim against the host state in an international arbitration 
forum, such as the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
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connection between an investor and a state is required. 
Typically, for natural persons, a national of a state party to the 
treaty or a citizen of the state is considered to be an investor of 
that state. The nationality is determined by the law of the state 
whose nationality is to be claimed to the extent not addressed in 
the treaty. Dual nationality, like in the case of many developing 
countries, may be permitted by state law. The possibility of dual 
nationality raises the question of whether dual nationals are 
allowed to be protected under the treaty if they have the 
nationality of the host state. The majority of treaties do not give 
an answer to this but provide a way to analyze this question. For 
example, treaties ask which state a person has the most 
substantial connection as a way of defining nationality for the 
purposes of the treaty. Residency in a specific state is typically 
not required.146 
The next issue is what or who is a legal or juridical person, 
such as a corporation? IIAs typically require that a legal person 
be incorporated or organized under the domestic laws of a party 
to claim its nationality.147 It is quite simple for foreigners to meet 
this condition and to therefore qualify for treaty protection. It is 
also easy for host states to determine whether a person legally 
qualifies for protection. The problems with such a definition is 
that it leads to very broad protection, and thus it may need to be 
confined with some conditions. This need depends on the 
domestic policy of the host state. Some states may not want 
further limits because they may want to make it as easy as 
possible for investors to qualify for protection under the treaty. 
Other states may be concerned about “treaty shopping.” Where 
simple incorporation in a country gives an investor the 
nationality of that country there is a risk that investors may take 
advantage of treaty protection. They could do this by simply 
incorporating a subsidiary in one party state for the purpose of 
making an investment in another party state. A domestic 
 
(ICSID) or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). A discriminatory act 
against an SWF can be followed by a direct claim by the SWF against the host 
state based on the applicable investment treaty between the host state and the 
home state of the SWF. Assuming successful passage through any jurisdictional 
challenges, an arbitration forum will have to decide whether the legislative or 
executive act can be considered a discriminatory measure that violates an 
investor protection standard. See Chaisse & Sejko, supra note 133, at 88. 
 146. See Agreement Between Canada and South Africa, supra note 144. 
 147. Chaisse & Sejko, Investor-State Arbitration Distorted: When the 
Claimant Is a State, in JUDGING THE STATE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT LAW: SOVEREIGNTY MODERN, THE LAW AND THE ECONOMICS, 
supra note 133, at 589. 
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investor in one party state could even seek the protection of the 
treaty against its own government by channeling an investment 
through a subsidiary in the other party state back into the first 
party state. Some countries, like Mauritius, that want to be 
international business hubs are not concerned about this 
problem, but other countries may want to manage their exposure 
to treaty obligations and are interested in targeting only a 
narrow class of investors.148 
Another alternative to address treaty shopping is a “denial 
of benefits” provision. Instead of incorporating requirements in 
the treaty definition of investor, a host state can deny the 
benefits of a treaty with a denial of benefits provision if 
particular criteria, such as seat, ultimate ownership, or 
substantial business presence in a party state, cannot be 
established by the investor.149 For example in Phoenix Action, an 
investor who was a Czech national had a dispute with the Czech 
government.150 He subsequently incorporated a corporation in 
Israel and transferred his investment to the Israeli corporation 
with the goal of making the investment eligible for protection 
under the Czech–Israel BIT.151 As an Israeli firm, that investor 
launched a claim against the Czech Republic.152 A hypothetical 
denial of benefits provision that contained a substantial 
“business activity in Israel” requirement could have been used 
to deny the benefits of the treaty to the investor.153 Some cases 
 
 148. To avoid treaty shopping, certain limitations are used in IIAs: (1) they 
require the ultimate owners who control investment to be nationals of the home 
state party. This is a rare approach in IIAs but would avoid misuse of protection. 
Such an approach is used in the Germany–Antigua and Barbuda BIT. TNCs 
often have quite complex structures making it difficult to determine where 
ultimate control resides, and (2) they require a legal person to have substantial 
business activity, or its seat (location of effective management), head office or 
some other significant connection in a state party. This is a common approach 
adopted in IIAs, but it is quite vague leading to uncertainty when the issue is 
addressed in investor–state tribunals. Sometimes tribunals, in interpreting the 
requirement for the seat to be in a party state have required a minimal 
connection. For example, in one case it was held that if one director is resident 
in the jurisdiction and the corporation files its financial statement in that 
country, the seat of the corporation is in that country. Hence the application of 
this requirement can be hard to predict in practice. 
 149. Lindsay Gastrell & Paul-Jean Le Cannu, Procedural Requirements of 
‘Denial-of-Benefits’ Clauses in Investment Treaties: A Review of Arbitral 
Decisions, 30 ICSID REV. 78, 79 (2015). 
 150. Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 
¶ 2 (Apr. 15, 2009). 
 151. Id. ¶ 22. 
 152. Id. ¶ 6. 
 153. See id. ¶ 38. 
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have interpreted denial of benefits provisions as requiring that 
states must give notice of a denial of benefits before a claim is 
filed. Whether this is a requirement will depend on how a “denial 
of benefits” provision is drafted. 
IIAs, being instruments of cooperation for the promotion, 
protection, and liberalization of foreign investment, have 
increased over recent years, and they grant rights to SCEs as 
long as they are “qualified investors,” as defined in the IIA. The 
legal framework of investment agreements has also evolved 
significantly, and thus the accompanying jurisprudence raises 
new questions about the interpretation and implementation of 
IIAs for governments and investors both in developed and 
developing countries. One feature of many investment 
agreements that have contributed to calls for a balancing of 
investor rights with responsibilities has been the grant of direct 
legal personality to investors; i.e., enabling them to mount an 
international arbitration against host states. Most recent 
investment agreements provide recourse to so-called investor–
state arbitration.154 If SCEs can operate as “qualified investors,” 
then the main question is whether SCEs can successfully use the 
investor–state dispute settlement mechanism, or whether they 
have to rely on traditional state-to-state channels. I will deal 
with the specific case of ICSID in a subsequent section. 
BITs or preferential trade agreements (PTAs) apply only to 
investments made by “investors” of one of the contracting parties 
in the territory of the other party.155 Most BITs have 
traditionally included a definition of “investor,” which covers 
both natural and legal persons.156 Concerning natural persons 
(which is relevant only when discussing SCEs), most IIAs protect 
persons who have the nationality of one of the contracting 
parties. Thus, the typical definition of a national of a state party 
is a natural person recognized by that party’s internal law as a 
national or citizen.157 Investments made by persons not covered 
 
 154. Gastrell & Cannu, supra note 149, at 84. 
 155. The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-
governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration. 
 156. See SUZY H. NIKIÈMA, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., BEST 
PRACTICES DEFINITION OF INVESTOR 1 (2012), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/
best_practices_definition_of_investor.pdf. 
 157. Sometimes, the “investor” definition is broadened to include not only 
citizens but also individuals who qualify as permanent residents under 
domestic law. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and 
the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
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under that definition will fall outside of the scope of the 
agreement. The definition of “investor” specifies what types of 
legal entities are covered. Such a provision helps to answer 
whether an SCE is covered in a specific situation because either 
there is an explicit mention or there is none. 
1. State-controlled Entities Explicitly Covered Investors 
During the United States’ preparation of the new 2012 
United States BIT model,158 there was considerable discussion 
about extending the coverage of BIT investment protections to 
state-owned enterprises. Only one change from the 2004 Model 
BIT was made in response to those discussions. The only 
modification was to include a footnote to Article 2.2(a) making it 
clear that the application of the substantive obligations of the 
BIT “to a state enterprise or other person when it exercises any 
regulatory, administrative, or other governmental authority 
delegated to it by that Party” covered government delegations 
effected by a wide variety of regulatory means, including the 
broad term “party action.”159 This language aims to address 
concerns that governments can delegate such governmental 
authority to state-owned enterprises through less formal means, 
even though the state-owned enterprise is effectively acting as a 
government entity at the government’s effective delegation. Of 
course, evidentiary proof of such an allegation will be a challenge 
in most circumstances. The United States government declined 
to adopt proposals for an inward screening mechanism for 
investments by state-owned enterprises or to regulate the 
competitive activities of state-owned enterprises under the BIT 
even when acting in a commercial manner.160 
 
H.K.-Austl., art. 1(f)(i)(A), Sept. 15, 1993, [1993] ATS 30. Natural persons 
having the nationality of both BIT parties under their respective laws: One 
possibility, following the international law principle of an effective link, is to 
consider a person as a national of the country of his/her dominant and effective 
nationality. 
 158. The United States concludes all of its BITs based on a model. The U.S. 
Department of State and the United States Trade Representative along with 
other agencies completed a 2012 Model BIT. See Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Related Agreements, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit (last 
visited July 31, 2015). For the text of the 2012 Model BIT, see also 2012 U.S. 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/188371.pdf (last visited July 31, 2015) [hereinafter 
2012 Model BIT]. 
 159. 2012 Model BIT, supra note 158, art. 2(a), n.8. 
 160. Charlene Barshefsky et al., United States to Resume Bilateral 
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The recent result of the United States’ attempts to refine the 
definition of “investor” and to decide whether SCEs should be 
explicitly incorporated is not surprising. Other treaties do 
provide an explicit reference to SCEs. For instance, a provision 
relevant to the issues of ownership and control presented in this 
case is Article 1139 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which defines “investment of an investor 
of a Party” as follows: 
[I]nvestment of an investor of a Party means an 
investment owned or controlled directly or indirectly by 
an investor of such Party. Investor of a Party means a 
Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an 
enterprise of such Party, that seeks to make, is making 
or has made an investment.161 
In the BIT between the United Arab Emirates and South 
Korea (2004), Article 1.3 reads “investors” to mean any natural 
or juridical persons of one Contracting Party, governmental or 
private, who invest in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party: (a) the term “natural persons” means natural persons 
having the nationality of one Contracting Party in accordance 
with its laws; and (b) the term “juridical persons” means any 
entity such as companies, public institutions, authorities, 
foundations, partnerships, firms, establishments, organizations, 
corporations or associations, incorporated or constituted in 
accordance with the laws and regulations of one Contracting 
Party.”162 Similarly, Article 1.4 of the United Arab Emirates–
Finland 2005 BIT explicitly mentioned financial institutions and 
investment authorities as protected foreign investors. According 
to Article 1 of this treaty, “[t]he term investor means ‘The 
government of the contracting state and any other legal person, 
such as public and private companies, financial institutions and 
investment authorities, having its seat in the territory of either 
 
Investment Treaty Negotiations on the Basis of a Revised Model Treaty, 
WILMERHALE (May 15, 2012), https://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publications
andnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=89748. 
 161. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 1139, Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 , 648 art. 1139 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 162. Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the 
Government of the United Arab Emirates for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, S. Kor-U.A.E., art. 1.3, June 9, 2002, https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/49761/Part/I-49761-080000028033111c.pdf. 
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contracting state.”163 
2. State-controlled Entities Not Explicitly Covered Investors 
Although some treaties may explicitly refer to SCEs, a large 
majority of IIAs simply do not make any mention of them 
generating some ambiguity as for the applicability of investment 
treaties to SCEs.164 In this situation, one may be tempted to 
follow a strict logic and conclude that if state entities are not 
mentioned among the investors covered by the treaty, they 
should not be protected by the treaty. A key legal argument 
would be that a state operating as an economic actor is in any 
case protected by the customary rules of international law. 
However, in the absence of an explicit mention of SCEs, 
ambiguity can only be settled by proper tribunal interpretation. 
B. THE TREATMENT OF SCES CLAIMS BY INVESTMENT 
TRIBUNALS 
One feature of many IIAs that has contributed to calls for a 
balancing of investor rights with responsibilities has been the 
grant of direct legal personality to investors, enabling them to 
mount international arbitrations against host states. Most 
recent investment agreements provide recourse to so-called 
investor-state arbitration “which entitles an injured investor to 
sue the host government for damages because of a violation 
of treaty standards and rights.”165 This novel device has 
permitted investors to challenge government measures, policies 
or actions which are thought to contravene the substantive 
provisions of a given treaty. 
 
 163. Agreement between the Government of Finland and the Government of 
the United Arab Emirates on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Fin.-U.A.E., art. 1.4(a), Apr. 12, 1996, 1981 U.N.T.S. 116. 
 164. For example in the Singapore–PRC BIT 1985 the definition of juridical 
person does not explicitly include SCEs as investors covered by the treaty. The 
definition covers only companies and it means: “(a) in respect of the People’s 
Republic of China, a company or other juridical person incorporated or 
constituted in its territory in accordance with its laws; (b) in respect of 
Singapore, any company, firm, association or body, with or without legal 
personality, incorporated, established or registered under the laws in force in 
the Republic of Singapore.” Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, China-Sing. art 1, Nov. 21, 1985, 1986 U.N.T.S. 293. 
 165. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 446 (2010). 
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The investor–state mechanism has given rise to a 
substantial volume of litigation in recent years. In stark 
contrast, the WTO dispute settlement rules are exclusively 
reserved for state-to-state disputes. On the basis of investor-
state arbitration provisions, disputes between a state party and 
an investor national of the other state are settled by 
international arbitration rather than by the domestic courts of 
the host state (as would be the case otherwise). The host 
government’s consent to the jurisdiction of an international 
arbitration tribunal is granted ex ante in the form of an open 
offer in either the investment treaty or in its national law. Over 
the last few years, investment disputes brought before 
international arbitrators have multiplied, and they have 
attracted attention by reason of the significant compensations 
host states have had to pay in some instances.166 
1. A Review of Cases Filed by SCEs 
This Section offers a review of the case law dealing with 
SCEs and SWFs. Although there are not many cases, this section 
focuses on the most important cases. Those cases mentioned in 
this section can foster a better understanding of how SCEs have 
been treated by the tribunals. There are in total nine investment 
claims which have been filed by SCEs (see Annex 1). The present 
Section only reviews decided cases. Among them, the most 
interesting are the four following awards: Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka, A. S. v. The Slovak Republic,167 Hrvatska 
Electroprivreda v. Slovenia,168 Rumeli Telekom v. 
Kazakhstan,169 and Telenor Mobile Communications v. 
Hungary.170 
 
 166. One notable example is the case of CME Czech Republic v. Czech 
Republic, a UNCITRAL arbitration under the Netherlands–Czech Republic 
BIT, which resulted in an award and payment of $269 million plus interest to 
an injured investor, one of the largest awards ever made in an arbitration 
proceeding. See CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (UNICITRAL), 
Final Award, ¶ 650 (Mar. 14, 2003); Peter S. Green, Czech Republic Pays $355 
Million to Media Concern, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/05/16/business/czech-republic-pays-355-million-to-media-concern.html. 
 167. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Award (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008). 
 168. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/24, Award of the Tribunal (Dec. 17, 2015). 
 169. Rumeli Telekom v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award 
(July 29, 2008). 
 170. Telenor Mobile Communications v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. 
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Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A. S. (CSOB) v. The 
Slovak Republic (Slovakia) is a case involving a dispute related 
to an international investment agreement before the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).171 CSOB claimed that Slovakia breached the 
“Agreement on the Basic Principles of a Financial Consolidation 
of Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A. S.” (Consolidation 
Agreement).172 The breach consisted of the failure by Slovakia to 
cover the losses incurred by the Slovenska inkasni spol. s. r. o. 
(Slovak Collection Company).173 CSOB required the respondent 
to fulfill the Consolidation Agreement: i.e., to pay the damages 
for the losses and cover the costs.174 Meanwhile, Slovakia 
claimed that the Claimant lacked jurisdiction to claim this by 
applying Article 25. 1 ICSID Convention.175 The issue of 
jurisdiction was the main legal issue that needed to be tackled 
by the Tribunal, as Article 25 ICSID only allows disputes 
“between a Contracting State and a national of another 
Contracting State.”176 Therefore, in this case, a key legal issue 
that arose was whether CSOB merely an agent of the Czech 
Republic or not.177 Another key legal issue was whether CSOB 
was a qualified investor, and if so, why it was a qualified 
investor.178 On May 24, 1999, the Tribunal unanimously found 
that the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the Centre and 
the competence of the Tribunal.179 The necessary order for the 
continuation of the proceedings on the merits would be issued.180 
Also, the Tribunal granted the request and recommended the 
suspension of the bankruptcy proceedings.181 In its reasoning, 
 
ARB/04/15, Award (Sept. 13, 2006), 17 ICSID Rep. 173 (2016). 
 171. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, 13 ICSID Rep. 183 ¶ 1. 
 172. Id. ¶ 1. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovk., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 10 (May 24, 1999),5 ICSID Rep. 335, 
338. 
 176. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States art. 25, Apr. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 177. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶¶ 27–37 (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008). 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. ¶ 3. 
 180. See id. ¶ 5. 
 181. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 9 (May 24, 1999), 5 ICSID 
Rep. 335, 338 (“[T]o the extent that such proceedings might include 
382 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2 
the Tribunal stated that what mattered was the nature of the 
activities and not their purpose.182 This case widens the scope of 
application of BITs and ICSID, which means that it widens the 
potential application of international investment law. 
Hrvatska Electroprivreda (HEP) v. Slovenia is another case 
that involved a dispute related to an international investment 
agreement before the ICSID.183 The dispute between HEP and 
Slovenia was about the ownership and operation of the Krško 
NPP, which is an important power resource for both countries.184 
HEP was seeking compensation from the respondent for the 
financial losses that suffered as a result of respondent’s failure 
to resume deliveries of electricity from the Krško NPP to HEP.185 
Also, HEP asserted a claim against respondent for breaching its 
obligation under a2001 Agreement to restore electricity 
deliveries to HEP from the Krško NPP by June 30, 2002.186 
Issues of jurisdiction were not seriously contested between the 
parties to this arbitration.187 On June 12, 2009, the majority of 
the Tribunal found that the Republic of Slovenia was liable to 
HEP for the financial value of undelivered electrical power from 
July 1, 2002 to April 10, 2003.188 This case shows that state-
controlled entities can make claims as a qualified investor. 
Rumeli Telekom (Rumeli) v. Kazakhstan was a case which 
involved a dispute before the ICSID related to an investment 
contract.189 Rumeli argued that Kazakhstan’s right to challenge 
 
determinations as to whether the Slovenska inkasni spol. s.r.o. [Slovak 
Collection Company] has a valid claim in the form of a right to receive funds 
from the Slovak Republic to cover its losses as contemplated in the 
Consolidation Agreement at issue in this arbitration.”) (citing Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 
Procedural Order No. 4, ¶ 1 (Jan. 11, 1999)). 
 182. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶ 
51. 
 183. See Hrvatska Elektroprivreda v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID Case No 
ARB/05/24, Treaty Interpretation, ¶¶ 6–15 (June 12, 2009). 
 184. Id. ¶ 6. 
 185. Id. ¶ 13. 
 186. Id. ¶ 15. 
 187. See id. ¶ 166 (“A threshold issue is whether under the 2001 Agreement, 
to which only Croatia and Slovenia are parties, this Tribunal has jurisdiction 
over the dispute presented to it. More precisely, can HEP bring this case against 
the Republic of Slovenia and before us? Issues of jurisdiction were not seriously 
contested between the parties to this arbitration; nevertheless, some questions 
were asked and in any event the Tribunal is obliged to be satisfied of its 
jurisdiction.”). 
 188. Id. ¶ 202. 
 189. See Rumeli Telekom v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, 
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the termination should be denied, and the compensation was not 
adequate because respondent wrongfully terminated the 
investment contract.190 Rumeli argued the Kazakhstan should 
be responsible for the termination of the investment contract 
and liable for losses caused by it’s failure to follow the BIT (the 
Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the 
Republic of Turkey concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, dated May 1, 1992).191 In this dispute, 
the main legal issues were whether Rumeli was a qualified 
investor and whether the state must benefit from its 
expropriation.192 This was similar to Ceskoslovenska Obchodni 
Banka v. Slovakia.193 Article 25 ICSID was an important 
provision in the dispute. On July 29, 2008, the Tribunal found 
that the respondent breached its obligation by failing to follow 
the BIT and that expropriation may occur without any benefit to 
the State.194 The Tribunal also found that the claimant was a 
qualified investor.195 
2. Should SCEs Use the Investor-State Dispute Mechanism 
or the State-to-State Dispute Mechanism? 
The main question is whether public entities can use the 
investor-state arbitration system or whether they have to use 
the state-to-state mechanism. It is an open question as the 
tribunal in Tulip v. Turkey Award held that there is no basis 
under international law to conclude that ownership of a 
corporate entity by the State triggers the presumption of 
Statehood; whilst State ownership may, in certain 
circumstances, be a factor relevant to the question of attribution, 
it does not convert a separate corporate entity into an ‘organ” of 
 
Award, ¶ 7 (July 29, 2008), (“On May 20, 1999, KaR-Tel and the Investment 
Committee executed Contract N° 0123-05-99 . . . .”). 
 190. Id. ¶ 11. 
 191. Id. ¶ 12. 
 192. See id. ¶¶ 9–12. 
 193. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/4, Award, ¶¶ 27–37. 
 194. Rumeli Telekom, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, ¶ 707 (“[T]hat the 
expropriation was not directly for the benefit of the State but for the benefit of 
Telecom Invest does not affect this conclusion, since, as the parties agree, 
expropriation can exist despite there being no obvious benefit to the State 
concerned.”). 
 195. Id. ¶¶ 333–36. 
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the State.196 Actually, as stated in Electrabel v. Hungary 
Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, the fact 
that a State acts through a state-owned or state-controlled 
company over which it exercises some influence is, by itself, 
insufficient for the acts of such entities to be attributed to the 
State.197 
In 2006, the Government of the Region of Kaliningrad 
(Russian Federation) commenced arbitration proceedings 
against Lithuania based on the bilateral investment treaty 
between the Russian Federation and Lithuania.198 The 
Government of the Region of Kaliningrad initiated arbitration, 
under the rules of the International Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).199 The ICC arbitral 
tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute 
and that the application was unfounded.200 Kaliningrad alleged 
that Lithuania was liable for expropriating the building owned 
by the Kaliningrad government (it was seized by order of the 
Lithuanian courts).201 The tribunal determined that the 
Kaliningrad regional government qualified as an investor 
 
 196. Tulip Real Estate Investment v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/28, Award, ¶ 289 (Mar. 10, 2014); see also Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 69 (Oct. 12, 2005 (holding that legal 
entities separate from the State are not organs of the State). 
 197. Electrabel v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.95 (Nov. 30, 2012). 
 198. In substance, the Government of the Region of Kaliningrad claimed 
compensation for the expropriation of its assets further to the enforcement of a 
2004 LCIA award which was rendered in favor of a Cyprus company against the 
Region of Kaliningrad (Russian Federation) for its failure to reimburse a loan. 
The 2004 LCIA award was enforced in Lithuania against two buildings that the 
Region of Kaliningrad owned there what triggered the Government of the 
Region of Kaliningrad claim before the ICC. See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional 
court of appeal] Paris, le ch., Nov. 18, 2010, 09/19535 (2010). 
 199. James Clark, Paris Court of Appeals Rules that Enforcement of an 
Arbitration Award Did Not Amount to Expropriation Under a BIT, THOMSON 
REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW (Dec. 21, 2010). 
 200. Dmitry Davydenko, French Judgment Unenforceable Because of Lack of 
Legal Certainty, CIS ARBITRATION FORUM (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.cis
arbitration.com/2015/03/30/french-judgment-unenforceable-because-of-lack-of-
legal-certainty (“The Region applied to the Paris Appellate Court to set aside 
the [ICC] award on jurisdiction but the Court rejected the claim. Furthermore, 
the Court held that the Region as a “losing party” must pay EUR 150,000 to the 
Republic of Lithuania under article 700 of the French Civil procedure code. 
Article 700 of the French Civil procedure code establishes the general rules of 
distribution of court expenses between the parties.”); see Kaliningrad Region v. 
Lith., ICC, Final Award (not public), (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/
cases/593. 
 201. Davydenko, supra note 200. 
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according to the definition contained in the treaty.202 The treaty 
refers to Russian law for guidance as to which persons and 
entities can be considered “investors.”203 This approach is sure 
to be debated in future investment treaty arbitrations, 
particularly given the large volumes of foreign investments 
made in recent years by states or parastatal entities. 
Telenor Mobile Communications A. S. v. The Republic of 
Hungary is a case that involved a dispute related to a specific 
Bilateral Agreement (2001) and Energy Charter Treaty before 
the ICSID.204 Telenor claimed that Hungary should pay 
damages for alleged losses, because respondent breached the 
BIT in 2002 and 2003.205 Telenor wanted the respondent to 
compensate their loss, which was caused by respondent’s failure 
to follow the BIT.206 Meanwhile, the Republic of Hungary 
claimed that the application treaty (i. e., Energy Charter Treaty) 
limited ICSID’s jurisdiction to expropriation claims; the 
claimant lacked standing and failed to establish a prima facie 
case.207 In this dispute, the main legal issues that arose were 
whether the MFN clause in the treaty extended the jurisdiction 
of the tribunal to categories of disputes beyond those set out in 
the treaty itself,208 and whether the claimant alleged facts 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case. On September 13, 
2006, the Tribunal dismissed the Telenor’s claim.209 The 
Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the claim because none of the 
allegations rose to the level of expropriation under international 
law and the BIT limit jurisdiction to expropriation claims.210 
Also, the claimant failed to establish a prima facie case.211 The 
Tribunal set a standard of review for investment treaty claims 
at the jurisdictional stage and confirmed the fundamental 
importance of respecting limits placed by sovereign States on 
 
 202. See id.; Davydenko, supra note 200. 
 203. Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of the Investments, Lith.-Russ., art. 1(1)(b), June 29, 1999. 
 204. See Telenor Mobile Communications v. Hung., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 16 (Sept. 13, 2006). 
 205. Id. ¶ 17. 
 206. See id. ¶ 17(1). 
 207. Id. ¶ 18. 
 208. See id. ¶ 20. 
 209. Id. ¶ 108(1). 
 210. See Telenor Mobile Communications v. Hung., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 102 (Sept. 13, 2006). 
 211. Id. ¶ 102(1). 
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their consent to international arbitration.212 
3. Are SCEs Entitled to Make a Claim before the ICSID? 
The access of public investors to ICSID is another 
controversial issue because it is not clear whether public 
investors can be considered “investors.”213 As stipulated in 
Article 25.1, “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a 
Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a 
national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the 
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its 
consent unilaterally.”214 A question immediately emerges when 
reading Article 25: Does the ICSID focus on private investment? 
According to its preamble, the ICSID was established with 
regard to “the role of private international investment.”215 
In ICSID case law, arbitrators have excluded jurisdiction 
over disputes between two states. It stated in the Maffezzini case 
(2000) that “[j]ust as the Centre has no jurisdiction to arbitrate 
disputes between two States, it also lacks jurisdiction to 
arbitrate disputes between two private entities. Its main 
jurisdictional feature is to decide disputes between a private 
investor and a State.”216 Moreover, the decision in the case 
Ceskoslovenska Obchodní Bankav v. Slovak Republic explained 
that: 
The language of Article 25(1) of the Convention makes 
clear that the Centre does not have jurisdiction over 
disputes between two or more Contracting States. 
Instead, the dispute settlement mechanism set up by the 
Convention is designed to deal with disputes between 
 
 212. See id. ¶ 97. 
 213. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 
[hereinafter ICSID Treaty] (explaining the jurisdiction of the ICSID). See 
generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A 
COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2009) (providing an in depth look at the ICSID 
Convention). 
 214. ICSID Treaty, supra note 213, art. 25(1). 
 215. Id. pmbl. 
 216. Maffezini v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tribunal 
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 74 (Jan. 25, 2000). 
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Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting 
States.217 
Actually, in ICSID case law, arbitrators have set a condition 
of control on jurisdiction over disputes between a state and a 
SCE. It is again in the Ceskoslovenska case that the issue was 
discussed which elaborated that: 
Although the concept of “national”, as that term is used 
in Article 25(1), is in Article 25(2) declared to include 
both natural and juridical persons, neither term is 
defined as such in the Convention. The legislative history 
of the Convention does provide some answers, however, 
that bear on the issues presented in this case. It indicates 
that the term “juridical persons” as employed in Article 
25 and, hence, the concept of “national,” was not intended 
to be limited to privately-owned companies, but to 
embrace also wholly or partially government-owned 
companies. This interpretation has found general 
acceptance.218 
There is no exclusion a priori of public investors but 
arbitrators underscore that “[w]hile it cannot be doubted that in 
performing the above-mentioned activities, Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni Banka was promoting the governmental policies or 
purposes of the State, the activities themselves were essentially 
commercial rather than governmental in nature.”219 
In the same vein, the GEA v. Ukraine Award found that an 
attempt to make the respondent liable for the actions of a former 
state-owned entity could not succeed because the record made it 
clear that the company was a separate legal entity, acting 
entirely in a commercial capacity, for which the respondent was 
not responsible.220 It seems that arbitrators wanted to rely on a 
criterion which would be the nature of the economic activities 
without, however, providing detailed criteria by which to enable 
a better definition of such an activity. In the current scenario, 
 
 217. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A. S. v. Slovk., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 16 (May 24, 
1999). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. ¶ 20. 
 220. GEA Group Aktiengesellschaft v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16, 
Award, ¶ 262 (Mar. 31, 2011). 
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one can simply observe that tribunals have slightly stretched the 
ICSID convention to allow SCEs, when they act on a commercial 
basis, to access international arbitration. In that sense, the 
whole global investment regime has been adjusted to the reality 
of new SCE actors. In essence, the nature of the economic 
activities has become more important than the nature of the 
SCEs. 
Another important legal issue is the sequence of events in 
an ICSID claim. Should a tribunal first look at Article 25 (quite 
narrow) or start with the BIT definition (usually broader). All 
this might be relevant to the discussion around the notion of 
investor under ICSID (i. e., the legal standing of SCEs under 
ICSID). Overall, it seems that there is no clear-cut methodology. 
In the Tokies Tokeles disputes, Professor Weill issued a 
dissenting opinion. He said that: 
To decide the jurisdictional issue the Decision should, 
therefore, have checked first whether the Tribunal has 
jurisdiction under Article 25 of the Convention— 
interpreted, as the decision recalls, in light of its object 
and purpose—and then, in a second stage, whether it has 
jurisdiction also under the bilateral investment treaty. It 
is only if the tribunal had reached the conclusion that it 
has jurisdiction under the Convention that it would have 
had to examine whether it has jurisdiction also under the 
BIT. This, however, is not how the Decision proceeds. It 
states that “we begin our analysis of this jurisdictional 
requirement by underscoring the deference this Tribunal 
owes to the definition of corporate nationality contained 
in the agreement between the Contracting Parties, in 
this case, the Ukraine–Lithuania BIT.” And this is what 
it does: it begins with the “Definition of ‘investor’ in 
Article 1(2) of the BIT,” and then in a second stage it 
turns to the “Consistency of Article 1(2) of the BIT with 
the ICSID Convention.”221 
However, it is the opposite approach that was applied by the 
tribunal in Malaysian Historical Salvor since it started with the 
applicable BIT before it looked at Article 25. 1 ICSID.222 The 
 
 221. Tokios Tokelés v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Dissenting Opinion 
(Chairman Prosper Weill), ¶ 14 (Apr. 29, 2004). 
 222. Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶ 75 (Apr. 16, 2009). 
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tribunal “applied these criteria to the contract and concluded 
that it constituted an investment pursuant to the BIT as well as 
Article 25 of the Washington Convention.”223 Also, in Global 
Trading v. Ukraine, the tribunal said that: 
Against that background, the Tribunal turns now to an 
analysis of the two governing treaties, namely the BIT 
and the ICSID Convention, in the light of the arguments 
put before it by the parties to the Arbitration. There 
seems to be no set methodology among ICSID tribunals 
as to whether the analysis ought to begin with the BIT, 
which goes to the condition of consent within the 
meaning of the ICSID Convention, or with the notion of 
investment under the ICSID Convention. In the present 
case, it makes no difference where the analysis starts. 
The Tribunal accordingly finds it convenient to begin 
with the BIT.224 
IV. NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONS AS THE 
BOUNDARIES OF SCES’ RIGHTS 
SCEs from various jurisdictions make investments and are 
becoming major legal actors because they can file a claim before 
international tribunals. This, in turn, raises the question of the 
substantive rights which is now given to state capitalism 
actors.225 The actionable rights of an SCE can fundamentally be 
divided into two stages. 
Firstly, the pre-establishment stage and the associated pre-
establishment rights (see Annex 2). These refer to the entry of 
investments and investors of a party (member country of a trade 
or investment agreement) into the territory of another party. 
 
 223. Id. 
 224. Global Trading Resource Corp. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11, 
Award, ¶ 46 (Dec. 1, 2010). 
 225. See generally Charles N. Brower & Diane Brown, From Pinochet in the 
House of Lords to the Chevron/Ecuador Lago Agrio Dispute: The Hottest Topics 
in International Dispute Resolution, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. 
L.J. 1 (2013) (explaining that states must provide effective means of asserting 
claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment); George K. Foster, 
Investors, States, and Stakeholders: Power Asymmetries in International 
Investment and the Stabilizing Potential of Investment Treaties, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 361 (2013) (explaining that states’ power to regulate the host 
country related to environment and human rights has been undermined by 
investment treaties). 
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Each party allows the investors of other parties to establish an 
investment in their territory on terms no less favorable than 
those that apply to domestic investors (NT) or investors from 
third countries (MFN treatment). In the case of the provision on 
performance requirements, pre-establishment refers to the 
prohibition of imposing certain performance requirements as a 
condition for the establishment of an investment.226 Pre-
establishment is rarely granted without exceptions since every 
country has sensitive sectors where foreign investment is not 
permitted. In fact, members of a trade or investment agreement 
usually list a number of measures (for example, laws and 
regulations) or entire sectors where pre-establishment (free 
entry of investments and investors) do not apply. 
Secondly, there is the post-establishment stage and 
associated post-establishment rights. These refer to the 
operation of an investment. It guarantees that foreign investors 
and their investments (those of another member country of the 
trade or investment agreement), once established or admitted, 
are treated no worse than domestic investors and their 
investments (NT) or any other foreign investors and their 
investments (MFN treatment).227 
C. EXCEPTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
Globalization has encouraged more foreign investment 
around the world and brought about more regulations to protect 
investors from any discriminatory action. Over the past decades, 
SCEs have been active in the FDI market. Correspondingly, 
concerns about the purpose of SCEs have been raised to 
attention, for example, whether the government behind intends 
to carry out any political action by making such investment and 
 
 226. Joshua Boone, How Developing Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral 
Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits to Their Domestic Economies, 1 GLOBAL 
BUS. L. REV. 187, 187 (2011) ( “The idea was to facilitate . . . investment flows 
by the opening up of secure channels for foreign direct investment . . . 
stabilizing the investment climate, granting protective investment guarantees, 
and providing neutral dispute mechanisms for ‘injured’ investors.”); see also 
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, 20, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No. 
E.09.II.D.20 (2009) [hereinafter Role of IIAs in Attracting FDI]. 
 227. See Michael Hahn and Kateryna Holzer, EMERGING ISSUES IN 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY 
RELATING TO NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 267 
(Mitsuo Matsushita & Thomas J. Schoenbaum eds. 2016). 
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whether the foreign investment will be a threat to the country. 
This section will discuss how the national security exception 
plays a role in foreign investment in the area of SOEs and SWFs. 
It will look at the available international economic law—WTO 
Law, IIAs, and CIL—and study the problems or gaps that need 
to be filled, conclude whether there can be improvements or 
possible solutions to tackle the problems, and bring spotlight to 
the world’s latest update in this area. 
The issue of national investment legislation is based on 
national security, which may block, impede, undo, or in some 
other way adversely affect investments made by SCEs. Such a 
domestic action would not be a violation of its GATS Mode 3 
commitments in itself. The country may indeed rely on GATS 
Article XIV bis in order to benefit from the “security exception.” 
It is true that one of the most critical concerns regarding foreign 
acquisitions is national security.228 The problem with national 
security issues is that there is no way to clearly define what 
types of investment invoke these concerns and what types do 
not. Most IIAs maintain exceptions for national security or 
subject investments to national interest tests.229 
D. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE 
SCEs investment raises concerns because they highlight the 
importance of state activity in the global economy, which is 
perceived as detrimental to the role of market forces. SCEs may 
not make investment decisions based on economic reasons, but 
instead they may choose to invest for political purposes. 
Furthermore, most countries that have set up SCEs are located 
in the developing world which ultimately may result in a 
politicization of capital flows vis-à-vis SCEs. 
 
 228. Giorgio Sacerdoti, BIT Protections and Economic Crises: Limits to Their 
Coverage, the Impact of Multilateral Financial Regulation and the Defense of 
Necessity, 28 ICSID REV. 351, 382 (2013); see also Chaisse, Exploring the 
Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections, supra 
note 115, at 358–59 (2013). 
 229. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of New Zealand and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China, N.Z.-China, art. 201, ¶ 1, 
Apr. 7, 2008, 2590 U.N.T.S. 46123 (showing exception for certain “essential 
security interests” and full investor-state arbitration provisions, even if 
countries conclude BITs and FTAs making it broadly easier for firms from either 
country to invest in the other, that sort of exception could be invoked by a 
contracting party, for example, to block or restrict an investment.). 
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The range of reasons articulated by host countries for 
scrutinizing SCEs and state-owned entities (SOEs) more than 
private investors are indicated in Box 1 below. 
 
Box 1. Main Reasons to Scrutinize SCEs more than 
Private Investors 
E. LEGAL EXCEPTIONS 
As there are more transnational investment transactions 
around the world, many countries have signed different 
international investment agreements, bilateral or multilateral, 
with different countries to stimulate market openness so as to 
attract more FDIs to build their economies. These agreements 
contain obligations, thought; he national security exception is a 
type of exceptions exempt from obligations assumed. It mainly 
controls the over-protection concern regarding measures against 
SWFs. 
 
 Fears that countries, as controlling authorities of SWFs, invest in 
companies with a view to acquiring “know-how” (e. g. , dual-use 
(civil and military) items and technologies; research, produce or 
trade in weapons; intellectual property) 
 Danger of foreign investment in companies that are directly or 
indirectly involved with issues of national security (e. g. , wire 
tapping and mail interception equipment; cryptology services; 
activities of firms entrusted with national defense secrets) 
 “Political” investments that create dependencies (e. g. , in the 
energy sector; water); 
 Lack of transparency in the investment policy of SWFs 
 Reciprocity: How can countries that invest in foreign companies 
via SWFs be prompted to adopt at his needs finishing. less 
restrictive policy with regard to foreign investment in their own 
country (e. g. Russia)?
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The fundamental concern is how to balance between 
national security and market liberalization. On the one hand, 
the host country has to protect its own nation and fellow citizens, 
while on the other hand, the foreign investor are concerned 
about being discriminated due to abuse of the protective 
measures by the host state. Additionally, such protective acts 
may also bring further political tensions. 
The issue of sovereign investment has raised attention due 
to opaqueness. As governments are involved, some doubt that 
the true motives behind sovereign investment are politically-
driven.230 SWFs mostly lack transparency, so the host country 
cannot determine whether the intentions of such investment are 
genuinely commercial or the investment will jeopardize national 
security and financial stability.231 They believe that if strategic 
industries fall under foreign control, the foreign government will 
take the advantage to attack the host country.232 For instance, 
assuming that a foreign country acquires a telecommunication 
company in another country, it is reasonable to be cautious that 
a leak of confidential information by surveillance may be 
possible. 
Especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the concerns 
provoked some countries to regulate and restrict sovereign 
investment in certain sectors, such as telecommunication and 
commodities.233 Even though there are studies indicating that 
restrictions are unnecessary,234 governments should always stay 
mindful of guarding harm. Some argue the measures for being 
over-protective and discriminatory to attract FDIs are the 
breach of international economic law.235 
Before the law regarding national security was developed, 
only Customary International Law could be relied on. To avoid 
disputes, including national security exceptions in international 
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treaties has been a developing trend.236 
F. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) LAW 
There are more than 160 members in the WTO, which 
means that WTO law is multilaterally binding.237 Since most 
countries involved in FDI are WTO members, WTO law becomes 
a principal law to solve many legal problems. This section will 
discuss why the GATS is more relevant and when the GATS is 
applicable in the context of SWFs. The section will then 
illustrate some major roles of the national security exception 
under the GATS and conclude by examining some underlying 
problems. 
Within the WTO treaties, the GATS is more relevant and 
important in the context of SWFs because it is the only legally 
binding law in relation to investment.238 Although the GATT 
does contain an article about Security Exception239 and thus is 
theoretically applicable, its principles are relatively limited. 
Some scholars view that GATT is too general.240 Even with its 
investment-related reference treaty, the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the GATT is still short 
of specific discipline. It means that the general principles 
provided may not be applicable to some specific investments, 
while the TRIMs do not give enough additional support and 
reference.241 
On the contrary, the GATS is more relevant when talking 
about FDIs such as SWFs because FDI nowadays trends towards 
the service sector. The purpose of GATS is to make sure the 
service sectors are liberalized for foreign investments, including 
state investments such as SOEs and SWFs, by “facilitating the 
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freedom of capital inflows in the service sector.”242 Hence, it is 
more specific yet flexible to be applied to service-related FDIs. 
The GATS is applicable to FDI when the investment takes 
form of “commercial presence” mode in the service sector, 
meaning that the foreign investor holds fifty percent 
ownership.243 Therefore, only when SWFs tend to take control of 
the target company will the GATS be applicable. 
To promote market liberalization in service sectors to 
foreign investors, the GATS imposes obligations on the host 
states.244 However, these obligations are subject to general 
exceptions and specific exceptions. The GATS Article 14 bis 
Security Exception illustrates one of the general exceptions 
regarding national security that the host state can rely on to 
refuse foreign investments. The purpose of this exception is to 
“preserve members’ freedom of action in areas relating to 
national defense and security.”245 The article provides that the 
states are exempted from the non-discriminatory obligations 
imposed when the investment concerns an “essential security 
interest.”246 It is reasonable for the host states to enforce 
necessary actions to restrain the access of FDIs to defend their 
national security interests and uphold public safety and 
stability. 
G. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CASE LAW 
Cases are very useful in filling in the gaps of the uncertainty 
of any IIA provisions regarding national security exception in 
order to predict the outcome while making investment decisions. 
As discussed above, the phrases like “essential security” or 
“national security” are too broad. This results in investment 
disputes which may lead to lawsuits. This section will study 
some significant cases which give more guidelines on how to 
interpret the IIAs. 
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1. Republic of Nicaragua v. United States247 
The case concerned whether the United States was justified 
in invoking the security defense in the context of the BIT signed 
between two countries. The words “necessary to protect its 
essential security interests”248 were brought under the spotlight 
in this case. The United States argued that the provision 
justified the adoption of the measure.249 However, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) compared the provision with 
the security exception under the GATT and found that the party 
may adopt measures that they “consider necessary” whereas the 
provision under the FCN Treaty “speaks simply of ‘necessary’ 
measures, not those considered by a party to be such.”250 
Therefore, it was held that the measure was not necessary to 
protect the security interest of the United States and that the 
provision did not allow any self-judging measures.251 Thus, the 
protective measure made by the United States was not final. 
2. Commission v. Belgium252 
There are various cases regarding the exception in the 
context of EU law. The proportionality test is used to justify the 
protective or restrictive measures implemented against the 
investment. This case held that the measure was compatible, 
and four criteria were set out to justify the use of the security 
exception.253 The criteria are (1) the national measures must aim 
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at the protection of a legitimate general interest, (2) foresee 
strict time limits for the exercise of opposition rights, (3) the 
assets or management decisions targeted must be specifically 
listed, and (4) the system’s objective and stable criteria must be 
subject to an effective review by the domestic courts.254 This case 
provides and clarifies the idea of how to justify the breach. The 
member may appropriately invoke the exception on the grounds 
of public order or public security when the criteria are satisfied. 
3. Argentine Cases 
After the Argentine economic crises in 2002, Argentina was 
involved in a series of lawsuits. The most significant dispute 
dealing with the national security exception was between 
Argentina and the United States.255 Like most recent BITs, the 
Argentina-United States BIT allows state-versus-state dispute 
settlement concerning the national security exception.256 
The BIT references the security exception provision with the 
phrase “the [p]rotection of its own essential security 
interests.”257 In one of the cases, it was held that major economic 
emergencies were considered “essential security interests.”258 
So, prima facie, Argentina could invoke the exception. However, 
the court continued to express that the article was not self-
judging.259 The decision shows that the court is reluctant to let 
states determine whether they can invoke the exceptions.260 The 
judgment also provides a framework that when either party 
would like to justify its breach of obligations based on the BIT’s 
exception, that party should show the relationship between the 
measures adopted and the “resolution of the crisis.”261 In 
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considering the applicability of Art XI Argentina-US BIT, the 
tribunals have adopted various interpretations of what may 
constitute ‘necessary’ in the cases involved US investors 
challenged Argentina’s emergency measures. The first three 
tribunals to deal with claims under Art. XI are CMS,262 
Encron,263 and Sempra.264 These tribunals conflated the 
requirements of Art. XI with the customary international law of 
necessity defense and each of the decisions was subject to 
application for annulment.265 The LG&E tribunal adopted a 
more flexible approach in determining the concept of “necessary” 
and stated the measures were suitable to respond to the crisis.266 
This approach has been criticized as “overly deferential”267 
without considering the effectiveness of the measures, but it 
seemed to have “required that the package of measures as a 
whole was capable of achieving the objective.”268 The tribunal in 
Continental case held that in determining the suitability of the 
measures to arrest the crisis, they need to decide whether the 
measures had ‘contributed materially’ to achieve the goals.269 In 
deciding the alternative measures, the tribunal granted ‘a 
certain deference’ given the circumstances of economic crisis,270 
and concluded in general the measures ‘were applied in a 
reasonable and proportionate way.’271 The Argentine cases 
provide direction on how a decision would likely conclude, which 
increases certainty. The decisions give more clarifications on 
how to interpret the security exception provision of a BIT when 
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the key terms are unclear. The case law provided lessons to the 
states for clearer terms and has assisted them to negotiate and 
conclude new BITs. After the Argentine case, the United States 
updated its treaty language based on the United States Model 
BIT.272 The United States has ensured the exception is self-
judging, so it can be invoked easily.273 Therefore, the claims 
actually fill in the existing gap and help further better the 
investment law and promote sovereign investments. 
H. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (CIL) 
When the treaties do not help conclude transnational 
problems, CIL is exercised. When binding treaties between the 
parties do not include explicit provisions, CIL is applied to seek 
clarification. In fact, there are quite a number of cases in which 
CIL has been used to reach conclusions. There are two major 
doctrines under CIL related in this context: necessity and self-
defense, which are mostly used when dealing with national 
security concerns.274 These two doctrines are uncodified but 
recognized by the International Law Commission in 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC 
Articles).275 The principles are often explicitly included in 
treaties so that legal cases will be considered according to CIL. 
ILC Article 25 provides a framework on how a state can justify 
the use of the security exception under the necessity defense of 
CIL. Two criteria have to be satisfied: first, the party who would 
like to invoke the defense must prove that the questioned 
measure is “the only way” to protect its essential interest, and 
second, that the measure “does not seriously impair an essential 
interest” of “the international community as a whole.”276 To 
avoid any abuse, Article 25 strictly limits the conditions for 
using the necessity defense, including national security. 277 
However, the inclusion of national security does not 
automatically mean that the issue rises to necessity. The phrase 
“the international community as a whole” is meant to prevent 
any acts of corruption so as to encourage an honest investment 
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environment and protect the collective interest of every country. 
CIL cannot be used as a means to exclude any wrongfulness or 
as an excuse because this will affect the collective interest, which 
consequently results in political tensions and influences the 
global investment environment. 
The case Sempra Energy International v. Republic of 
Argentina details how CIL can be applied to decide whether the 
related security exception can be invoked. It illustrates that the 
court will check if there is any violation of treaties by 
interpreting the terms literally.278 If the concerned treaties do 
not consist of any self-judging feature, the measures adopted will 
then be examined to see if it is necessary for the party to invoke 
the exception. 279 Lastly, CIL will help define the scope of 
“essential security,” in this case under ILC Article 25.280 
Therefore, it seems that the CIL acts as a last resort for the state 
party to justify its breach of obligation due to national security. 
Some scholars commented that “[t]he notion of necessity 
ascertained in the international customary law . . . is far more 
accurate than the definition of essential security interest . . . in 
national statutes.”281 This is because the ILC Articles provides a 
clear framework on how to justify measures adopted under the 
necessity defense. Related cases further upheld the certainty of 
such framework. Apart from being used to interpret explicit 
national security provisions, CIL determines whether there is 
any implicit exception “to permit states to respond to 
emergencies and to hostile actions by others.”282 Some treaties 
may not include an explicit provision about national security 
exemptions, but it would be unreasonable for a state to have no 
right to carry out protective measures to safeguard its security. 
Hence, CIL can imply the use of a national security exception. 
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V. UNITED STATES-CHINA BIT 
The recent focus on the national security exception is the 
BIT negotiation between the United States and China because 
these two countries are leaders in international economics. The 
conclusion of the United States-China BIT will encourage more 
FDI between the two countries.283 This BIT will be important in 
regards to the national security exception in the context of SWFs 
because most FDIs by communist China in foreign countries are 
in SWF form.284 The United States has been involved in many 
significant cases on rejecting sovereign investments, such as the 
Dubai Port World, and the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC).285 In the CNOOC acquisition case, the 
United States decided to reject this sovereign investment, 
fearing that this acquisition deal would threaten its national 
security.286 However, to avoid tensions with the United States, 
China eventually withdrew its investment on Unocal Oil 
Company due to political pressure.287 Because no BIT exists 
between the two countries, only WTO law and the term 
“essential security” was concerned. In the recent United States-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the BIT was one of the 
negotiation topics.288 Within the BIT negotiation, cyber-security 
has been one of the security concerns.289 Placing a high 
importance on its national security, especially after the 9/11 
incident and Snowden political scandals, the United States will 
stand strong on safeguarding its security interests and rights to 
invoke the security defense. Also, the target is “communist” 
China, which has been involved in many FDI-related violations, 
such as violations of cybersecurity and intellectual property 
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rights. Therefore, negotiation will be difficult for both 
countries290—especially for the United States, which has agreed 
to various treaties with different countries. 
The conclusion of the BIT is forward-looking. It not only will 
promote trade liberalization and further encourage FDIs but will 
also become a cornerstone of international economics. 
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
After investigating different types of applicable law, it is 
apparent that the law is still uncertain. The law in the context 
of sovereign investment is not perfect and has not been updated 
to be in sync with the rise and change of SWFs. 
Some scholars have expressed the view that international 
economic law should ascertain the rights of states in this area, 
particularly by amending the terms in treaties.291 Some suggest 
clarifications by the WTO, inclusion of obligations regarding 
SWFs, or clearer definitions provided by the IIAs.292 These 
suggestions have their benefits and concerns. “The broader these 
exceptions are, the easier it will be for governments to limit 
SWFs’ access . . . . The [narrower] these limits are . . . the easier 
it will be for SWFs to come into the . . . market.”293 It may appear 
that the listed exceptions will alleviate the problems and 
depoliticize SWFs, but there is a chance that some states will 
deceive the host state by taking advantage of these solutions 
with political purposes. 
Measures implemented by the host states may provide a 
clearer way for reference. Although each country has its own law 
regarding the national security review system, such as Foreign 
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA) in the 
United States,294 the IIAs can mention the use of the respective 
national law or any measures to be taken which may be different 
from the express one regarding SWFs. This can increase 
predictability and transparency of the review system. SWF 
investors will feel more protected with more certainty and will 
then be able to invest more effectively. This way, sovereign 
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investment can be further promoted. 
Some suggest standardization of IIAs may ensure certainty 
and transparency.295 However, this goes against the unique 
feature of every treaty. Every state has their own 
characteristics, such as demography, geography, or natural 
resources. Some states may demand more applications of the 
national security exception, while some may not. The conclusion 
of an IIA may be drafted based on previous treaties with some 
terms amended accordingly, but standardized IIAs will not fit 
every state and hence would create other investment problems. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The recent emergence of SCEs as active and important 
players in international financial markets has raised a host of 
questions, which are focused on in the current analysis. As the 
current financial turmoil demonstrates, financial liquidity is 
vital for Western economies. SCEs as a class of investor will 
grow considerably in importance over the next decade, both by 
number and volume. At the same time, the number of 
international investment disputes arising from investment 
agreements has increased sharply. Likewise, the cases brought 
to dispute settlement have become increasingly complex, 
creating various interpretations of their provisions and 
generating huge debates between governments, academics, and 
practitioners. There have been until now only a handful of 
disputes involving state-controlled entities against host states. 
It seems that rather often no restriction exists for SCE to act 
under an IIA as a “qualified investor” (but treatment standards 
may vary from one treaty to another). These investors may also 
rely on the more adequate investor–state dispute mechanism 
instead of the more political state-to-state dispute procedures, 
which demonstrates the potential for international investment 
arbitration involving SCEs. 
SCEs are on the rise and likely to increase even more. Once 
the crisis is over, the problems will return. There will be new 
disputes that are likely to be treated as any other foreign 
investor. However, SCEs do have rather more favorable access 
to DSB than private actors. Meanwhile, access to arbitration 
may evolve as criteria do not seem well-established. The key 
issue which may be brought before arbitration is the one of 
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national security. If so, however, we are likely to see more cases 
in which the (more broadly frustrated) home state of a frustrated 
investor reacts—even in a later context—against what it may 
have perceived as an overeager invocation of the national 
security exception. 
In the current scenario, one can simply observe that 
international investment tribunals have slightly stretched the 
ICSID convention to allow SCE, when they act on a commercial 
basis, to access international arbitration. In that sense, the 
whole global investment regime has adjusted to the reality of 
new actors that are SCEs. In essence, the nature of the economic 
activities has become more important than the nature of the 
SCEs. 
The national security exception is very crucial to 
international economics because it directly affects the FDI 
environment. It provides an exemption from a state’s regular 
obligations to safeguard its security interests by prohibiting 
suspicious government-controlled investments from being 
established in its territory. However, the international economic 
law also avoids any abuse of this exception. The language of the 
exception in treaties determines whether a state is justified to 
invoke such an exemption. Every term will be interpreted 
prudently, particularly the term “essential security” in all 
contexts. If there is no explicit provision addressing such 
concern, then CIL will be the final resort. In fact, there are not 
many cases regarding the use of the exception because no one 
would like to bring political tensions. The law directly affects 
FDI performance around the world. The exception plays both 
political and commercial roles; it promotes market openness and 
cooperation between countries. Additionally, it releases any 
political tensions and improves political relationships. It 
balances the national interests and financial benefits of the 
sovereign parties. With the rise of SWFs and trend of FDI, there 
may be more conflicts concerning national security. 
Undoubtedly, the certainty of right and predictability requires 
clarification of the terms. There are many suggestions to 
improve the terms. The United States-China BIT conclusion will 
be under the spotlight to see how the leaders will strike a 
balance between tackling the national security matters and 
promoting FDIs. 
The current scenario is technically favorable to SCEs, and it 
shows that they can now operate like any other private investor. 
Further, the whole ICSID and investment regime was designed 
for the promotion of foreign private investment. However, the 
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SCEs have now become significant players who are treated like 
any private investors. State capitalism has become ordinary, 
and in this sense, state capitalism now “comes of age,” as said by 
Ian Bremer.296 It is a paradox that the system states designed to 
promote private investment is being gradually penetrated and 
reshaped by state capitalism without much difficulty. 
While there are solutions for SCEs, there are challenges for 
policy-makers because it raises the question of a good definition 
of investor, treatment of SCEs in future, and IIAs and treaties. 
If these trends continue, namely, if direct investor-state 
arbitration provisions are concluded or reinterpreted to restrict 
the ability of home states to have second thoughts about foreign 
investments once they have been accepted, it seems to me that 
they will be more careful in allowing FDI. But when they do, 
somewhere down the line, they may get a reaction from a 
frustrated home state, and we will be back to the world 
dominated by individual states, i.e. capitalism. 
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Annex 1: Investment Cases (Decided and 
Registered) Dealing with the Legal Standing of 
SCEs 
Case Definition of 
investor in 
applicable 
BIT 
Did 
respondent 
raise the 
issue of the 
SOE nature? 
How was the 
SCE treated? 
Findings 
CDC Group PLC 
v. Republic of 
the Seychelles297 
N/A Issues of 
jurisdiction are 
the main legal 
issue that 
needed to be 
tackled by the 
Tribunal. As 
Article 25 of the 
ICSID only 
allows disputes 
“between a 
Contracting 
State and a 
national of 
another 
Contracting 
State.”298 
Therefore, in 
this dispute, 
the main legal 
issue that arose 
was whether 
CSOB was 
merely an 
agent of the 
Czech Republic 
or not. 
Generally, the 
main legal 
issue to decide 
CDC is a 
public 
company 
incorporated 
under the 
Companies act 
1985 in 
England and 
Wales. At all 
material times 
CDC has been, 
and continues 
to be a 
national of the 
United 
Kingdom. The 
tribunal does 
not argue the 
fulfilment of 
the conditions 
of Art 25(1) 
ICSID. 
The UK 
government 
owns 40% of 
CDC. 
Seychelles 
initially 
objected to the 
jurisdiction on 
ICSID art 25 
grounds but 
withdrew the 
objection 
during the oral 
hearing. 
 
 297. CDC Group PLC v. Republic of the Sey., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, 
Award, (Dec. 17, 2003). 
 298. ICSID Treaty, supra note 213, art. 25. 
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is whether 
CSOB is a 
qualified 
investor, and if 
so, why it is a 
qualified 
investor? 
Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni 
Banka, A. S. v. 
The Slovak 
Republic299 
The BIT 
meaning of 
investor was 
not 
determinant to 
the decision. 
However, the 
Consolidation 
Agreement 
stated the 
definition of 
investor. 
Article 25 of 
ICSID only 
allows disputes 
“between a 
Contracting 
State and a 
national of 
another 
Contracting 
State.” 
Therefore, in 
this dispute, 
the main legal 
issue that arose 
was one of 
jurisdiction— 
whether CSOB 
was merely an 
agent of the 
Czech Republic 
or not. 
Generally, the 
main legal 
issue to decide 
is whether 
CSOB is a 
qualified 
investor, and if 
so, why it is a 
qualified 
investor? 
 
CSOB was 
treated as a 
foreign 
investor based 
on the 
meaning of 
art. 25 ICSID 
and won the 
case. 
The Tribunal 
unanimously 
found that the 
dispute was 
within the 
jurisdiction and 
competence of 
the Tribunal. 
The necessary 
order for the 
continuation of 
the proceedings 
on the merits 
will be issued. 
Also, the 
Tribunal 
granted the 
request and 
recommended 
the suspension 
of the 
bankruptcy 
proceedings; 
the Tribunal 
stated that 
what mattered 
was the nature 
of the activities 
and not their 
purpose. This 
case broadens 
the scope of 
BITs 
 
 299. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovk., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/4, Award, (Dec. 29, 2004), 13 ICSID Rep. 183 (2008). 
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application and 
ICSID, which 
means that it 
broadens the 
potential 
application of 
investment law. 
The measures 
taken by the 
CSOB to 
improve its 
balance and 
consolidate its 
financial 
position, 
removing from 
the books non-
performing 
assets derived 
from activities 
conducted by 
the bank when 
acted as agent 
of the state, 
must be 
deemed to be 
commercial in 
character. The 
ability to 
negotiate in 
favorable 
conditions, 
determined by 
the interest of 
the States, does 
not transform 
commercial 
transactions 
into 
government 
acts. 
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Telenor Mobile 
Communications 
A. S. v. The 
Republic of 
Hungary300 
“a) any natural 
person 
possessing the 
nationality of a 
contracting 
party 
according to its 
laws 
b) any 
corporation, 
company, firm 
enterprise, and 
association 
incorporated 
or constituted 
under the law 
in force of the 
territory of a 
contracting 
party.”301 
In this dispute, 
the main legal 
issue was 
whether the 
most-favored-
nation clause in 
a treaty may 
have been used 
to extend the 
jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal to 
categories of 
disputes 
beyond those 
set out in the 
treaty itself; 
whether the 
claimant 
alleged facts 
sufficient to 
make out a 
prima facie 
case of 
expropriation. 
 
Norway owns 
75% of Telenor 
but Hungary 
did not contest 
jurisdiction on 
the grounds of 
art. 25 of the 
ICSID 
Agreement. 
The Tribunal 
dismissed the  
claim holding it 
did not have 
jurisdiction 
over the claims 
brought by 
Telenor 
because the 
BIT limited 
jurisdiction 
only applies to 
expropriation 
claims and 
Telenor failed 
to bring a 
prima facie 
claim. 
The Tribunal 
set a standard 
for the initial 
review of 
investment 
treaty claims at 
the 
jurisdictional 
stage and 
confirmed that 
respect towards 
the limits 
placed by 
sovereign 
States on their 
consent to 
international 
arbitration is 
fundamentally 
important. 
 
 
 300. Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Hung., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/15, Award, (Sept. 13, 2006), 17 ICSID Rep. 173 (2016). 
 301. Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investors, art. 1, Nor.-Hung., 
Apr. 8, 1991. 
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Rumeli Telekom 
A. S. v. Republic 
of Kazakhstan 
302 
 
“(b) 
corporations, 
firms or 
business 
associations 
incorporated 
or constituted 
under the law 
in force of 
either of the 
Parties, and 
having their 
headquarter in 
the territory of 
that Party.”303 
In this dispute, 
the main legal 
issue that arose 
was whether 
Rumeli is a 
qualified 
investor and 
whether the 
state must 
benefit from its 
expropriation. 
The main legal 
issue in this 
case is similar 
to 
Ceskoslovenska 
Obchodni 
Banka, A. S. v 
The Slovak 
Republic. 
Article 25 
ICSID acts as 
an important 
provision in the 
dispute. 
 
Claimants are 
companies 
incorporated 
and existing 
under the laws 
of Turkey. 
Turkey 
ratified the 
ICSID 
Convention on 
March 3, 1989. 
Claimants 
therefore 
appear as 
prima facie 
nationals of a 
Contracting 
State under 
the meaning of 
Article 25. The 
claimant won 
the case on 
grounds of 
FET and 
expropriation. 
The Tribunal 
found that the 
respondent 
breached its 
obligation, 
failed to follow 
the BIT, that 
and 
expropriation 
may occur 
without any 
benefit to the 
State. Also, the 
Tribunal found 
that the 
claimant was a 
qualified 
investor.             
The state 
agency newly 
appointed 
managers 
continued to 
run Petitioner 
companies as 
telecommuni-
cations 
companies and 
started ICSID 
arbitration. The 
TSDIF however 
was not a 
claimant. 
The Tribunal 
also considered 
that Article 
25(2)(b), stating 
that a national 
of another 
 
 302. Rumeli Telekom A.S. v. Kaz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, (July 
29, 2008). 
 303.  Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, art. 1, Kaz.-Turk., May 1, 1992. 
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contracting 
State also 
means “any 
juridical person 
which had the 
nationality of 
the Contracting 
State party to 
the dispute on 
“the date on 
which the 
parties 
submitted the 
dispute to 
arbitration” 
and which, 
because of 
foreign control, 
the parties 
have agreed 
that they 
should be 
treated as a 
national of 
another 
Contracting 
State for the 
purposes of this 
Convention,” 
was inserted to 
broaden the 
scope of 
ICSID’s 
jurisdiction and 
not to limit it, 
as evidenced by 
the awards 
invoked by 
Respondent, 
such as the 
SOABI, the 
Vacuum Salt 
and LETCO 
cases. The 
412 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 27:2 
parties refer to 
the CSOB case. 
Kaliningrad 
Region v. 
Lithuania304 
“a) any natural 
person who is 
a national of 
the state of 
this 
Contracting 
Party 
according to 
the legislation 
of this 
Contracting 
Party and 
authorized to 
invest in the 
territory of the 
other 
Contracting 
Party 
according to 
the legislation 
of the latter 
Contracting 
Party; 
b) in regards to 
the Russian 
Federation: 
any legal 
person, 
constituted or 
established 
according to 
the legislation 
in force, in the 
territory of the 
Russian 
Federation 
provided this 
legal person is 
authorized 
Information 
unavailable. 
Award not 
publicly 
available as of 
August, 1 2010. 
Information 
unavailable. 
Award not 
publicly 
available as of 
August, 1 
2010. 
Information 
unavailable. 
Award not 
publicly 
available as of 
August 1, 2010. 
 
 304. Kaliningrad Region v. Lith., ICC, Final Award, (Jan. 28, 2009). 
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according to 
the legislation 
of the Russian 
Federation to 
invest in the 
territory of the 
Republic of 
Lithuania; in 
regards to the 
Republic of 
Lithuania: any 
entity 
constituted 
and registered 
in the territory 
of the Republic 
of Lithuania in 
conformity 
with its 
legislation.”305 
Hrvatska 
Elektroprivreda 
d. d. v. The 
Republic of 
Slovenia306 
“Investor’ 
means: (a) 
with respect to 
a Contracting 
Party: 
(i) a natural 
person having 
the citizenship 
or nationality 
of or who is 
permanently 
residing in 
that 
Contracting 
Party in 
accordance 
with its 
Issues of 
jurisdiction 
were not 
seriously 
contested in 
this arbitration. 
“HEP,” the 
Croatian 
national 
electric 
company, 
changed its 
status from a 
state-owned to 
a joint-stock 
company. 
From 1994 to 
the date of 
award, the 
Croatian 
government 
owned 100% of 
the stock in 
The majority of 
the Tribunal 
found that 
Slovenia was 
liable to HEP 
for the financial 
value of 
undelivered 
electrical power 
from July 1, 
2002 to April 
10, 2003. This 
case shows that 
state controlled 
entitles can 
make a claim 
as an investor. 
 
 305. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of the 
Investments, art. 1, Lith.-Russ. June 29, 1999. 
 306. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d. v. Slovn., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, 
Decision on the Treaty Interpretation Issue, (June 12, 2015); Hrvatska 
Elektroprivreda d.d. v. Slovn., ICSID Case No. AERB/05/24, Award, (Dec. 17, 
2005).  
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applicable law; 
(ii) a company 
or other 
organization 
organized in 
accordance 
with the law 
applicable in 
that 
Contracting 
Party; 
(b) with 
respect to a 
‘third state,’ a 
natural 
person, 
company or 
other 
organization 
which fulfils, 
mutatis 
mutandis, the 
conditions 
specified in 
subparagraph 
(a) for a 
Contracting 
Party.” 307 
HEP. HEP 
was claimed to 
have operated 
on a cost-
covering basis. 
The 
jurisdiction 
was not 
examined 
under art 25 
(1) ICSID 
Convention. 
Issues of 
jurisdiction 
were not 
seriously 
contested 
between the 
parties to this 
arbitration. 
“The two State 
Parties to the 
[2001] 
Agreement 
have entered 
into it as the 
ultimate 
shareholders of 
the immediate 
‘Shareholders’ 
of NEK d. o. o.” 
The Agreement 
establishes in 
detail the 
points 
generally 
included in a 
shareholders 
agreement. In 
doing so it gives 
their respective 
wholly-owned 
immediate 
‘Shareholders’ 
of NEK d. o. o. 
the right to 
arbitrate 
directly against 
the ‘other State 
Party’ for any 
failure on the 
latter’s part to 
cause its 
 
 307. Energy Charter Treaty art. 1.7, Dec. 17, 1994, I-36116 U.N.T.S. 95.  
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wholly-owned 
‘Shareholder’ to 
comply with the 
Agreement. 
Moreover, in 
Article 12(1)2 of 
the Agreement 
(entitled 
‘Protection of 
Investments’) 
‘[t]he 
Contracting 
Parties 
agree . . . that 
they shall 
ensure fair and 
impartial 
treatment of 
the 
Shareholders 
belonging to the 
other 
Contracting 
Party on their 
territories, i. e. 
that they shall 
treat such 
Shareholder 
the same way 
as its own 
Shareholder, 
with full 
protection and 
security of 
investments for 
the duration of 
the joint 
investment.”308 
 
 308. Hrvatska Elektroprivreda, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/24, Decision on the 
Treaty Interpretation Issue, ¶ 168. 
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Mohamed 
Abdulmohsen 
AlKharafi & 
Sons Co. v The 
Government of 
the State of 
Libya and others 
(Libyan 
Investment 
Authority 
(“LIA”) 2012)309 
“Arab investor: 
an Arab citizen 
who owns 
Arab capital 
which he 
invests in the 
territory of a 
State Party of 
which he is not 
a national.” 310 
Issues of 
jurisdiction 
were the main 
legal issues of 
this 
Arbitration. 
The Tribunal 
rejected the 
request to join 
LIA, 
acknowledged 
the role of LIA 
as an integral 
part of Libya, 
including the 
role of 
implementing 
this arbitral 
award. 
The Tribunal 
upheld its own 
jurisdiction, 
and found 
Libya to be in 
breach of 
contract, Libya 
law, and the 
Unified 
Agreement for 
the Investment 
of Arab Capital 
in the Arab 
States. 
Beijing Urban 
Construction 
Group Co. Ltd. 
v. Republic of 
Yemen311 
TBD312 TBD Beijing Urban 
Construction 
Group is a 
large 
international 
comprehensive 
construction 
group. 
Nominally, 
this company 
is a limited 
company 
publicly listed 
at Shanghai 
Stock 
Exchange. In 
fact, this 
company that 
Pending (as of 
January 2018, 
the proceeding 
is suspended, 
pursuant to the 
parties’ 
agreement.) 
 
 309. Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi & Sons Co. v. Libya, Final Arbitral 
Award, 263, 266, 268, (Mar. 22, 2013) (Ad-hoc Arb.). 
 310. Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab 
States art. 1.7, Nov. 26, 1980. 
 311. Beijing Urban Construction Group Co. v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/14/30, (May 31, 2017). 
 312. The Tribunal will apply the China- Yemen BIT. Id. ¶ 53; see Agreement 
on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Yemen, China-Yemen, Feb. 16, 1998, http://globalsummitryproject.
com.s197331.gridserver.com/RuleofLaw/bits/yemen2010.html.  
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began its 
operation in 
1958 as a 
state-owned 
professional 
survey and 
design 
institute, 
specifically for 
the Beijing 
Subway Line. 
Then the 
Company was 
converted into 
a joint stock 
company with 
limited 
liability and 
renamed as 
‘Beijing Urban 
Construction 
Design 
Development 
Group Co., 
Ltd. on 
October 28, 
2013. 
Therefore, this 
company is 
less likely to 
be a state-
owned 
company 
because there 
is no factual 
evidence 
showing so. 
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Hanocal 
Holding B. V. 
and IPIC 
International B. 
V. v. Republic of 
Korea313 
The term 
``investors” 
means with 
regard to 
either 
Contracting 
Party: 
a) “natural 
persons 
having the 
nationality of 
that 
Contracting 
Party;” and 
b) “legal 
persons 
constituted 
under the law 
of that 
Contracting 
Party,” who 
made an 
investment in 
the territory 
of the other 
Contracting 
Party.314 
Data not 
available (the 
proceeding 
was 
discontinued 
after the first 
hearing and 
the Tribunal’s 
procedural 
order) 
“IPIC is the 
International 
Petroleum 
Investment 
Company, 
formed by the 
Abu Dhabi 
government 
in 1984 to 
invest in the 
energy and 
related 
sectors across 
the globe.”315 
Hanocal 
Holding B. V. 
is a company 
based out of 
Netherlands 
and is 
categorized as 
an accounting 
and legal 
firm. 
 
N/A (The 
proceeding was 
discontinued 
after the first 
hearing and 
the Tribunal’s 
procedural 
order.) 
 
 
 
  
 
 313. Hanocal Holding B.V. v. S. Kor., ICSID Case No. ARB/15/17, (May 20, 
2015). 
 314. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments between 
the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Government of the 
Republic of Korea, art. 1, Neth.-S. Kor., July 12, 2003. 
 315. IPIC, TOTAL, http://ae.total.com/en-us/ipic. 
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Annex 2: Substantive and Procedural Rights 
Granted by IIAs to SCEs 
International 
Legal 
Instrument 
Liberalization 
(Pre-
establishment 
Commitments) 
Protection 
(Substantive 
Rights) 
Litigation 
(State-to-
State 
Dispute) 
Litigation 
(Investor–
State 
Dispute) 
BITs and 
PTAs 
Sometimes 
(NAFTA like 
agreements) 
“Fair and 
equitable 
treatment,” 
“full protection 
and security,” 
expropriation 
conditions and 
the non-
discrimination 
standards 
Yes Yes 
WTO GATS Yes (Mode 3) Non-
discrimination 
standards only 
Yes No 
IMF 
Principles 
No Institutional 
framework and 
governance 
structure, 
investment and 
risk 
management 
framework 
No No 
 
 
 
